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INTRODUCTION 
Historically, very few nonprofit entities1 sought bankruptcy 
protection; rather, when faced with insurmountable financial 
difficulties, they simply dissolved.2  In the wake of the financial 
crisis and in response to calls to operate more like for-profit 
businesses,3 however, nonprofits have increasingly turned to 
bankruptcy, filing petitions and planning to reorganize.  Since 
2008, charities, churches, dairy and utility cooperatives, 
hospitals, the largest non-profit guarantor of private education 
loans, a monorail, museums, performing arts groups, and 
retirement communities have filed Chapter 11 petitions.4   
 
1 The nonprofit sector encompasses a large and diverse set of organizations, 
including churches, hospitals, schools, social organizations, museums, legal service 
providers, and community cooperatives. Taken together, nonprofits hold more than 
$1 trillion in assets and generate revenues of approximately $700 billion per year. 
See Gail A. Lasprogata & Marya N. Cotten, Contemplating “Enterprise”: The 
Business and Legal Challenges of Social Entrepreneurship, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 67, 67 
(2003). No one definition of a nonprofit entity covers all nonprofit entities. See, e.g., 
id. at 69 (noting that some nonprofits are more “entrepreneurial”). For the purposes 
of this Article, the only pertinent characteristic of nonprofits is their lack of equity 
holders similar in nature to equity holders of for-profit entities. For example, Title 
11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) does not define “nonprofit.” 
The term, however, is generally understood to include any organizational structure 
under which members, directors, or officers are precluded from receiving 
distributions of income. In the context of bankruptcy, § 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code, which grants tax-exempt status to organizations formed for certain 
purposes, is often referenced to determine nonprofit status, and covers organizations 
providing charitable, educational, health care, literary, religious, scientific, and 
various other services. Many states statutorily exclude towns, cities, and similar 
municipal entities from the definition of “nonprofit.” See Andrew M. Troop, et al., 
Reorganizing with Value but Without Profit (or Equity): Select Confirmation Issues 
for Nonprofit Entities, 19 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 147, 148 (2010) (citing 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1057 (6th ed. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-1002 (2009)). 
The Bankruptcy Code similarly distinguishes municipalities, with Chapter 9 of the 
Bankruptcy Code providing for reorganization of municipalities. See 
11 U.S.C.A. § 109(c)(1) (West 2011).  
2 Stephanie Strom, Bankruptcy Now Touching Nonprofits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 
2009, at A17. 
3 Id. 
4 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Petition, In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, No. 11-20059-
svk (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Jan. 4, 2011); Bankruptcy Petition, In re Crystal Cathedral 
Ministries, No. 8:10-bk-24771-RK (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2010); Bankruptcy 
Petition, In re Naknek Elec. Ass’n, Inc., No. A10-00824 (Bankr. D. Alaska Sept. 29, 
2010); Bankruptcy Petition, In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y., No. 10-
11963-cgm (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2010); Bankruptcy Petition, In re Las Vegas 
Monorail Co., No. 10-10464-bam (Bankr. D. Nev. Jan. 13, 2010); Bankruptcy 
Petition, In re Erickson Ret. Cmtys., No. 09-37010-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 
2009); Bankruptcy Petition, In re Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, Inc., No. 09-13560 
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Though the Bankruptcy Code does not prevent nonprofit 
entities from filing Chapter 11 petitions,5 Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code was designed for and is predominately applied 
to for-profit entities’ structure and business objectives.6  This 
history and orientation often creates challenges for courts 
administering nonprofit bankruptcies, most acutely in regards to 
reviewing a nonprofit’s proposed plan of reorganization.  With 
nonprofit bankruptcy filings on the rise, courts will be presented 
with nonprofits’ reorganization plans more and more often, and 
they will be required to hone how the less applicable provisions of 
Chapter 11 interact with a nonprofit’s plan.  Simply because 
Chapter 11 does not contemplate nonprofits’ unique structures 
and operational goals does not mean that the guiding policies 
behind the requirements of Chapter 11 should not apply with the 
same force and intention to nonprofits.  In an effort to bring 
courts one step closer to applying the same rigorous approval 
criteria to nonprofits’ reorganization plans, this Article focuses on 
one crucial aspect of courts’ evaluation of plans—the fair and 
equitable standard.   
This standard, set forth in Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, requires that a plan of reorganization be “fair and 
equitable” as to each class of creditors or interest holders that is 
not paid in full7 and does not vote to accept the plan.8  The fair 
 
(Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 18, 2009); Bankruptcy Petition, In re Humboldt Creamery, LLC, 
No. 09-11078 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2009); Bankruptcy Petition, In re St. Mary’s 
Hosp., No. 09-15619-MS (Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 9, 2009); Bankruptcy Petition, In re 
Nat’l Heritage Found., Inc., No. 09-10525-BFK (Bankr. E.D. Va. Jan. 24, 2009); 
Bankruptcy Petition, In re Balt. Opera Co., Inc., No. 08-26265 (Bankr. D. Md. Dec. 9, 
2008); Bankruptcy Petition, In re Copia, No. 08-12576 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 
2008); Bankruptcy Petition, In re The Educ. Res. Inst., Inc., No. 08-12540 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. Apr. 7, 2008).  
5 Section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code governs what entities may file a 
bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109 (West 2011). It allows a “person” to be a 
debtor under the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 109(a). “Person” includes individuals, 
partnerships, and corporations. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(41) (West 2011).  
6 Section 77B was added to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the “Bankruptcy Act”) 
specifically to regulate the reorganization of corporations. Section 77B was 
superseded by Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, which similarly applied to 
corporations, and which remained in effect until the enactment of the Bankruptcy 
Code. See infra notes 54 & 58 and accompanying text. 
7 Such classes are deemed “impaired.” A class of claims or interests is “impaired” 
under a plan of reorganization if the plan alters the legal, equitable, or contractual 
rights of the class. 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (2006). 
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and equitable standard operates among classes of creditors and 
interest holders with different priorities, providing a vertical 
limit on nonconsensual confirmation.9  The standard is triggered 
when a debtor or other plan proponent wishes to “cramdown”10 a 
plan of reorganization over the objection of an impaired or 
dissenting class.   
Although the Bankruptcy Code does not define what it 
means for a plan to be “fair and equitable,” at a minimum, it 
explicitly requires that the plan satisfy the “absolute priority 
rule.”  Of pertinence to nonprofit reorganizations, the absolute 
priority rule provides that only if a debtor pays its creditors in 
full can owners receive any of the reorganized entity’s going  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 Section 1129 states sixteen potentially applicable criteria that a plan must 
meet in order to be confirmed. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a) (West 2011). Pursuant to 
11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(1), 
if all of the applicable requirements of subsection (a) of [Section 1129] other 
than paragraph (8) are met with respect to a plan, the court, on request of 
the proponent of the plan, shall confirm the plan notwithstanding the 
requirements of such paragraph if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, 
and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests 
that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan. 
Paragraph 8 of 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a) provides: “With respect to each class of claims 
or interests—(A) such class has accepted the plan; or (B) such class is not impaired 
under the plan.”  
9 Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 11, 
72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227, 227–28 (1998); see also In re Simmons, 288 B.R. 737, 747 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) (“[T]he term ‘fair and equitable’ establishes in chapter 11 a 
test of vertical fairness . . . .”); In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 696, 703–04 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999). 
10 For an explanation of “cramdown,” see generally Kenneth N. Klee, All You 
Ever Wanted To Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979); Richard Maloy, A Primer on Cramdown—How and Why it 
Works, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1 (2003); Isaac M. Pachulski, The Cram Down and 
Valuation Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 58 N.C. L. REV. 925 (1980).  
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concern value.11  Thus, owners of a company cannot retain 
ownership of the reorganized company unless each class of 
creditors consents or is paid in full. 
Satisfaction of the absolute priority rule, however, does not 
guarantee that a court will find a proposed plan “fair and 
equitable.”12  In not defining “fair and equitable,” the Bankruptcy 
Code leaves the doctrine to be developed by case law and an 
analysis of the origins of the standard.13  Nonetheless, because 
the absolute priority rule is viewed as “the cornerstone of 
 
11 See, e.g., Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in 
Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 70 (1991) [hereinafter Absolute 
Priority] ; Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of Absolute Priority, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
9, 9 (1991). The absolute priority rule is codified in 11 U.S.C.A § 1129(b)(2) (West 
2011). Of pertinence, § 1129(b)(2)(B) reads:  
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and 
equitable with respect to a class includes the following requirements: 
  . . . . 
 (B) With respect to a class of unsecured claims— 
 (i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class receive or 
retain on account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date 
of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim; or 
 (ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such 
class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior 
claim or interest any property . . . . 
Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B). 
“Owners” are those individuals and entities entitled under non-bankruptcy law to 
any surplus in the value of a debtor, such as shareholders and partners. Absolute 
Priority, supra note 11, at 70 n.2; see also Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, 
Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 738, 740 n.8 (1988) (defining “owners” to include any individual or entity 
that has a claim to the income stream or assets of the debtor). Going concern value is 
the difference between the liquidation value of a debtor and the value of the business 
if it continues operating. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 223 (1977). 
12 See, e.g., Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. D & F Constr., Inc. (In re D & F 
Constr. Inc.), 865 F.2d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Section 1129(b)(2) sets minimal 
standards plans must meet. However, it is not to be interpreted as requiring that 
every plan not prohibited be approved. A court must consider the entire plan in the 
context of the rights of the creditors under state law and the particular facts and 
circumstances when determining whether a plan is ‘fair and equitable.’ ”); East West 
Bank v. Ravello Landing, LLC, 2:09-CV-02224-PMP-LRL, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
101007, at *28–29 (D. Nev. Sept. 7, 2010) (noting that courts have described 
§ 1129(b)(2) as “alternative minimum requirements for finding a plan fair and 
equitable” and that although meeting the requirements of § 1129(b)(2) is necessary 
for a plan to be confirmed, “it may not be sufficient for a fairness finding”); In re 
Dollar Assocs., 172 B.R. 945, 952–53 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that a plan 
was not fair and equitable despite satisfying § 1129(b)(2)); Kenneth N. Klee, Cram 
Down II, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 229, 229 (1990) [hereinafter Cram Down II] (discussing 
“the uncodified aspects of the fair and equitable rule”). 
13 Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 71–72.  
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reorganization practice and theory,”14 it has largely become 
synonymous with the fair and equitable standard.15  Accordingly, 
when creditors of a nonprofit argue that a nonprofit’s proposed 
plan of reorganization does not meet the fair and equitable 
standard, they typically claim that the plan violates the absolute 
priority rule. 
When confronted with absolute priority claims in nonprofit 
bankruptcies, courts have struggled with how to apply the rule to 
plans that propose to allow pre-petition interest holders of the 
nonprofit—such as directors, managers, or members—to retain 
control of the nonprofit, or which appear to allocate going concern 
value of the nonprofit to pre-petition interest holders or the 
nonprofit itself without providing for or paying the nonprofit’s 
creditors in full.  Because the majority of nonprofits do not have 
residual claimants similar to for-profit entities’ owners, any 
management rights or going concern value retained by these pre-
petition interest holders or the nonprofit itself, seemingly by 
definition, does not flow to the equity holders that the absolute 
priority rule fundamentally addresses.16  Nevertheless, 
conceptually, when a nonprofit’s plan allows directors or 
managers to retain control or allocates going concern value to 
members or merely to the nonprofit itself, creditors may view 
 
14 Id. at 123. 
15 See, e.g., Charles D. Booth, The Cramdown on Secured Creditors: An Impetus 
Toward Settlement, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 69, 78 (1986) (“Much of the Congressional 
debate [regarding the Bankruptcy Code of 1979] revolved around the ‘fair and 
equitable’ standards which had been cast in the form of the ‘absolute priority 
rule’ . . . .”); Paul B. Lewis, Bankruptcy Thermodynamics, 50 FLA. L. REV. 329, 342 
(1998) (“For impaired dissenting unsecured creditors, a plan is deemed to be fair and 
equitable if it satisfies the terms of the absolute priority rule.”).  
16 The Bankruptcy Code does not define “interest.” Courts generally hold that 
“interest” is limited to an equity interest in the debtor. See, e.g., Osborn v. Univ. 
Med. Assocs., No. 2-01-4002-18, 2003 WL 25734356, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 11, 2003) 
(“[P]laintiff has conceded that a private individual may not possess an ownership 
interest in a nonprofit entity . . . . ”); In re Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen & 
Helpers Union Local 890, 225 B.R. 719, 736 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1998) (“An ‘interest’ is 
that which is held by an ‘equity security holder,’ pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 501(a); an 
‘equity security holder’ is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(17) as the ‘holder of an equity 
security of the debtor’; an ‘equity security’ is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(16) as a 
share in a corporation ‘or similar security’ (or certain warrants or rights concerning 
the same), or the interest of a limited partner in a limited partnership (or certain 
warrants or rights concerning the same).”). As specifically applied to the absolute 
priority rule, courts hold that “interest” means “equity interest.” In re Wabash 
Valley Power Ass’n (Wabash II), 72 F.3d 1305, 1313 (7th Cir. 1995); see also infra 
Part I (detailing the development of the absolute priority rule). 
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such a plan as tantamount to the nonprofit’s “owners” receiving 
value.  And if the plan does not pay creditors in full, creditors 
will object. 
The few courts that have decided absolute priority claims in 
nonprofit bankruptcies overall hold that because the majority of 
nonprofits do not have “owners” who hold “equity interests” 
resembling for-profit businesses’ equity holders, the absolute 
priority rule is categorically satisfied by—and, thus, categorically 
inapplicable to—nonprofit entities.  These courts have engaged in 
a fact-specific analysis of the ownership structure of the nonprofit 
at issue,17 focusing particularly on the retained “interest” or 
“control” in question and considering whether the nonprofit 
substantively is more akin to a for-profit entity for the purposes 
of the rule.18   
 
17 Some courts seemingly have concluded that the structural limitations of 
nonprofits render the absolute priority rule categorically inapplicable without the 
need for a fact-specific analysis of the ownership structure at issue. See, e.g., In re 
Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp., 282 B.R. 444, 453 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he 
Hospital’s nonprofit status puts creditors in an unusually disadvantaged negotiating 
position because they are not able to assert the Bankruptcy Code’s absolute priority 
rule to block unacceptable plans . . . . ”); In re Independence Vill., Inc., 52 B.R. 715, 
726 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (“[The debtor] is a non-profit corporation. It has no 
shareholders, hence there are no interests inferior to the unsecured creditors. Thus 
there should be little difficulty with the absolute priority rule . . . . ”) (citations 
omitted); Amelia Rawls, Comment, Applying the Absolute Priority Rule to Nonprofit 
Enterprises in Bankruptcy, 118 YALE L.J. 1231, 1233–34 (2009) (“[Some courts] have 
concluded that old interest holders of a nonprofit are permitted to control it 
throughout its reorganization process, reasoning that the operational limitations 
inherent to nonprofits render the absolute priority rule effectively irrelevant. On the 
other hand, [other courts] have not inferred any inevitability about nonprofit 
compliance with absolute priority, applying the rule on fact-specific grounds to reject 
reorganization Plans that allowed old interests to be preserved.”). These courts, 
however, only considered the absolute priority rule secondarily to their main 
analyses. Those courts that fully addressed the rule in the context of a nonprofit 
reorganization engaged in a fact-specific analysis of the subject nonprofit even if the 
court’s ultimate conclusion was that the absolute priority rule did not apply to the 
“interest” or “control” retained. See infra Part III.  
18 See, e.g., Sec. Farms v. Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, 
Local 890 (In re Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local 890), 265 
F.3d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the contractual right to escheatment of a 
labor union’s parent did not create any immediate ownership in the union for the 
purposes of the absolute priority rule, and thus affirming the bankruptcy court’s 
confirmation of the plan); Wabash II, 72 F.3d at 1320 (“Control of the cooperative 
provides no opportunity, either currently or in the future, for the Members to obtain 
profits or any equity in Wabash’s assets and control itself is not an equity interest.”); 
S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Grps., Inc., 252 B.R. 373, 388–89 (E.D. 
Tex. 2000) (holding that patronage stock was property of the debtor’s members that 
they could not retain through reorganization unless creditors were paid in full). 
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Moreover, in line with the common perception that the 
absolute priority rule is synonymous with the fair and equitable 
standard, despite the reach of the standard beyond the rule, only 
one of the courts addressing absolute priority claims in the 
context of a nonprofit reorganization seemed to consider whether 
the nonprofit debtor had demonstrated that the standard was 
otherwise satisfied before holding the challenged plan to be “fair 
and equitable.”19  At best, certain statements in a few other 
opinions indicate that those courts understood the fair and 
equitable standard to encompass more than the absolute priority 
rule.20  In the end, once courts dispense with the absolute priority 
rule, they uniformly hold the challenged plan to be “fair and 
equitable.”   
These courts have missed an opportunity to develop a body of 
case law that explains what “fair and equitable” means in the 
non-profit reorganizations.  Though the statutorily codified 
absolute priority rule may not apply to nonprofits, or only in 
certain circumstances, the theory underlying the rule does not 
 
19 See Wabash II, 72 F.3d at 1318 (stating that “[t]he absolute priority rule is an 
aspect of the requirement that a plan be ‘fair and equitable’ ” and that “[t]here is 
some appearance of unfairness in the Wabash Plan,” but then concluding that those 
aspects of the plan were not as unfair as they may seem at first blush). In addition, 
after addressing the absolute priority rule, the court in In re Whittaker Memorial 
Hospital Ass’n, further held that “[t]he plan is fair and equitable to creditors.” 149 
B.R. 812, 816 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993). In so holding, the court wrote one sentence: “A 
single creditor is objecting and its particular complaints addressed.” Id. The relevant 
“complaints” were (1) that the plan violated the absolute priority rule, (2) that the 
plan provided for disparate treatment of unsecured creditors, and (3) that, because 
the plan violated the absolute priority rule and treated unsecured creditors 
disparately, the plan was not fair and equitable. Id. at 815. Disparate treatment is 
addressed by the Bankruptcy Code’s “unfair discrimination” standard and is distinct 
from the fair and equitable standard. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b) (West 2011); 
Markell, supra note 9, at 227–28 (explaining that the “unfair discrimination” and 
fair and equitable standards provide separate horizontal and vertical protections to 
creditors). Thus, the only aspect of the fair and equitable standard that the court 
considered was the absolute priority rule.  
20 See, e.g., In re Gen. Teamsters, 265 F.3d at 877 ( “[T]he plan represented the 
[union]’s honest effort to satisfy the demands of its creditors.”); In re Whittaker 
Mem’l Hosp., 149 B.R. at 817 (noting, in dicta, that “the debtor must give priority, 
next to the care of its patients, to the position of [a certain creditor] . . . . [The 
creditor] is financing all of this and the debtor must be dedicated and determined 
that for [the creditor]’s sake the plan is successfully consummated.”); In re Wabash 
Valley Power Ass’n (Wabash I), No. 85-2238-RWV-11, 1991 WL 11004220, at *60 
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. Aug. 7, 1991) (“Wabash’s Plan satisfies the economic 
underpinnings of the absolute priority rule because it converts every piece of 
economic property in Wabash into cash to be paid to its creditors.”). 
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lose its vitality in the context of a nonprofit’s reorganization plan.  
If a nonprofit debtor proposes a plan that would not satisfy the 
absolute priority rule if the nonprofit’s interest holders were 
equity holders of a for-profit entity, merely because the debtor is 
a nonprofit and the retained “interest” at issue does not rise to 
the level of a for-profit “interest,” it does not follow that the plan 
is magically fair and equitable.  These courts’ failure to examine 
the parallels between for-profit and nonprofit reorganization and 
the interconnectedness of the absolute priority rule and the fair 
and equitable standard has nurtured scholarship that proposes a 
limited view of the absolute priority rule’s relevance to nonprofit 
reorganization, advises that the rule is easily circumvented, and 
merely expresses dismay that the rule cannot be used by 
creditors of nonprofits.21   
Reorganization aims to restructure an ailing business’s 
operations, preserving value that may be lost through 
liquidation.22  The absolute priority rule prohibits equity holders 
from receiving this value ahead of creditors until all creditors are 
paid in full.  The rule provides a powerful check on the ability of 
a debtor to propose a plan of reorganization that simply is too 
good a deal for its owners, and, thereby, itself.  As evidenced by 
case law addressing absolute priority claims in the context of 
nonprofit reorganization, however, the rule does not apply 
cleanly to nonprofit entities because of their lack of equity 
holders.  This has lead courts overall to hold that the absolute 
priority rule is inapplicable to nonprofits.  In so holding, courts 
have removed an essential check in the reorganization process.  
This Article proposes a theory that will restore this check by 
linking the absolute priority rule with the fair and equitable 
standard, making the rule robust enough to handle the non-
traditional structures of nonprofit entities. 
 
21 See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., “Sovereignty” Issues and the Church Bankruptcy 
Cases, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 345, 355–58 (2005) (discussing how the absolute 
priority rule may not apply in church bankruptcies); Troop, supra note 1, at 148–53 
(advising how to “[r]etain[] [c]ontrol [w]ithout [p]ayment in [f]ull[]”); Rawls, supra 
note 17, at 1234–35 (distinguishing between nonprofit entities with an 
“entrepreneurial” structure and a “mutual” structure and suggesting that the 
absolute priority rule should apply to “mutual” nonprofits). 
22 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 220 (1977) (“The purpose of a business 
reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to restructure a business’s finances 
so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its 
creditors . . . .  It is more economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate . . . .”). 
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The remainder of this Article proceeds in two stages.  First, 
Parts II, III, and IV provide the background necessary to develop 
the theory.  Part II chronicles the development of the fair and 
equitable standard and the absolute priority rule.  This history is 
important to understanding the interconnectedness of the rule 
with the standard.  Part III details the key functions of the 
absolute priority rule and the rule’s application to for-profit 
entities, with an emphasis on concerns regarding its 
compatibility with close corporations.  This review highlights 
how courts’ current application of the absolute priority rule to 
nonprofits contravenes the rule’s purposes and deviates from the 
rule’s application to functionally similar for-profit entities, 
thereby creating situations in which plans that courts otherwise 
may reject are confirmed simply because the reorganizing 
entities are nonprofits.  Next, before the Article sets forth a 
theory that reconciles this deviation, Part IV overviews the 
limited body of case law analyzing the rule’s operation in 
nonprofit bankruptcies.  This overview provides one of the first 
compilations of cases dealing with nonprofit bankruptcies and 
begins to create a history of nonprofit reorganization.   
The last three parts of the Article develop a theory of how 
the absolute priority rule, by way of its core tenets, applies to all 
nonprofit entities through the fair and equitable standard.  
Combining the insights of Parts II and III with current case law, 
Part V first sets forth the theory and then provides examples of 
the theory’s application.  Part VI suggests criticisms of the theory 
and, responding to those criticisms, explores the implications of 
applying Chapter 11 to nonprofits.  Finally, Part VII offers 
concluding thoughts about the expanded utility of the absolute 
priority rule.   
I. HISTORY OF THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE STANDARD AND THE 
ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE 
A. Foundational Case Law 
Both the term “fair and equitable” and the absolute priority 
rule originated with the railroad insolvencies and equity 
receiverships of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
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centuries.23  Railroads were expanding rapidly and investors 
were freely contributing capital, but many of the railroads could 
not generate revenue sufficient to meet their debts.  With the 
help of a creditor, the railroad would become subject to an “equity 
receivership.”24  The receiver would sell the railroad’s assets to a 
newly created entity, which usually was controlled by the 
stockholders of the old railroad.  To acquire the old railroad, after 
negotiating with bondholders, the “new” investors would pay an 
amount less than the total due on the old railroad’s senior debt, 
either paying off or issuing new debt to the bondholders and 
completely eliminating the old railroad’s unsecured debt.  
Through this rearranging of ownership and payment scheme, the 
old railroad would become the new railroad absent any 
unsecured debt and a portion of senior debt.  Most importantly, 
the old railroad’s management, bondholders, and investors—who 
often were the same—would remain in control.25 
Understandably, this trick enraged unsecured creditors.  The 
best way for them to protest that the “old” stockholders were 
being treated unjustifiably favorably to the unsecured creditors’ 
detriment was to sue the “new” railroad and/or stockholders26 
and, relying on fraudulent conveyance law, argue that the 
foreclosure defrauded unsecured creditors.27  The first time the 
 
23 The history of the absolute priority rule has been detailed repeatedly since the 
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute 
Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963, 969–79 (1989); Douglas G. Baird & 
Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd’s Legacy and Blackstone’s Ghost, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 
393, 397–425 (1999); Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 74–90; Pachulski, supra 
note 10, at 938–45. This Article highlights those aspects of its history most pertinent 
to the rule’s application to nonprofits. 
24 The creditor would initiate a proceeding in federal court, claim that the 
railroad could not meet its debts as they became due, and request “the court to use 
its equity power to administer the property for the satisfaction of claims, and to 
appoint a receiver to keep the business going in the meantime: hence, ‘equity 
receivership.’ ” Ayer, supra note 21, at 970.  
25 See id.; see also Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. 
Am., Inc.), 634 F.3d 79, 94 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Wabash Valley Power Ass’n (Wabash 
II), 72 F.3d 1305, 1314 (7th Cir. 1995); Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 76. 
26 Because foreclosure courts, where the old railroad’s assets were sold, typically 
believed themselves limited to deciding the sale price, unsecured creditors’ 
remaining recourse was to attack the new railroad and stockholders. See Randolph 
J. Haines, The Unwarranted Attack on New Value, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 387, 398 
(1998).  
27 Under common law, a transfer was considered fraudulent if it was intended to 
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. See Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 76; Baird 
& Rasmussen, supra note 23, at 398.  
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Supreme Court was presented with such a trick, instead of 
selling the railroad back to its original owners, the railroad 
merely sought to pay stockholders ahead of unsecured creditors.   
In Railroad Co. v. Howard,28 the railroad owed $7 million to 
secured bondholders.  Upon insolvency, the railroad’s 
stockholders negotiated with the bondholders to sell the railroad 
to a newly-formed entity and to distribute the proceeds to the 
bondholders and stockholders.29  As agreed, the new entity 
purchased the railroad for $5.5 million and distributed sixteen 
percent to the stockholders.30  Thereby, the secured bondholders 
received approximately $5 million on their $7 million claim, 
unsecured creditors received nothing, and the stockholders 
received approximately $500,000.   
Unsecured creditors asserted that the stockholders could not 
be paid before all unsecured creditors were paid in full.31  In 
response, the bondholders argued that the payment to the 
stockholders did not originate from the railroad, but, rather, was 
property of the bondholders that they gratuitously gave to the 
stockholders so as to expedite the foreclosure sale.32   
The Supreme Court began its analysis with two fundamental 
principles: the railroad’s assets were “held in trust for the 
payment of the debts of the [railroad],”33 and “[c]reditors are 
preferred to stockholders on account of the peculiar trust in their 
favor.”34  Next, it rejected the bondholders’ contention that money 
paid to the stockholders belonged to the bondholders.35  From 
there, it held that the unsecured creditors were entitled to the 
money distributed to the stockholders.36   
 
28 74 U.S. 392 (1868). 
29 Id. at 408. 
30 Id. at 408–09.  
31 Id. at 413. 
32 R.R. Co. v. Howard, 74 U.S. 392, 411 (1868).  
33 Howard, 74 U.S. at 409. 
34 Id. at 411. 
35 “Holders of bonds secured by mortgage as in this case, may exact the whole 
amount of the bonds, principal and interest, or they may, if they see fit, accept a 
percentage as a compromise in full discharge of their respective claims, but 
whenever their lien is legally discharged, the property embraced in the mortgage, or 
whatever remains of it, belongs to the corporation . . . . Prompt payment was secured 
by the bondholders, and it is highly probable that they received under that 
arrangement a larger portion of their claims than they could have obtained in any 
other way.”  
Id. at 414–15. 
36 Id. at 410.  
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Perhaps the most pressing unanswered questions of Howard 
were whether the Court would have found for the unsecured 
creditors if the stockholders received ownership in the acquiring 
entity rather than cash37 and whether unsecured creditors could 
agree to allow stockholders to receive payment or ownership.38  
Despite the outstanding issues coupled with the Court’s clear 
statement of creditors’ rights, railroad reorganizations continued 
in the same manner for the next forty-five years,39 unabated even 
after the Supreme Court’s first encounter with a fully 
manipulative equity receivership scheme. 
In Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago 
Railway Co.,40 after entering into receivership, the railroad sold 
itself to the existing bondholders and stockholders, thereby 
ridding itself of troublesome unsecured debt.41  Before striking 
down the scheme, the Supreme Court noted that the “peculiar 
character and conditions of” railroads as “[i]nstrument[s] of 
public service” justified the elevation of unsecured creditors as 
against “contract and recorded liens”42 and then held that any 
sale “which attempts to preserve any interest or right of [the 
stockholders] in the [railroad] after the sale must necessarily 
secure and preserve the prior rights of general creditors 
thereof.”43  Following this statement, the Court announced what 
evolved into the absolute priority rule:   
[S]tockholder’s interest in the property is subordinate to the 
rights of creditors.  First, of secured, and then of unsecured, 
creditors.  And any arrangement of the parties by which the 
subordinate rights and interests of the stockholders are 
attempted to be secured at the expense of the prior rights of 
either class of creditors comes within judicial denunciation.44 
Not until 1913 did the Supreme Court have a chance to 
bolster its position in Howard.  When it did, it rendered an 
opinion that ushered in “[t]he modern law of corporate 
 
37 See Haines, supra note 26, at 400; Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 77 n.47. 
38 This question is most often linked with subsequent cases decided by the 
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 15, at 72–74. Regardless, the question is 
equally applicable to Howard. 
39 Haines, supra note 26, at 400.  
40 174 U.S. 674 (1899).  
41 Id. at 679–81. 
42 Id. at 682.  
43 Id. at 684. 
44 Id.  
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reorganizations”45 and lead to the death of railroad receivership 
schemes that violated the fully articled “absolute priority rule.”46  
As in Howard and Louisville Trust, Northern Pacific Railway Co. 
v. Boyd47 involved a railroad selling itself to bondholders and 
stockholders without providing payment or property to unsecured 
creditors.  Relying on fraudulent conveyance law, Boyd, an 
unsecured creditor, alleged that the old railroad’s debts to Boyd 
and other unsecured creditors became liabilities of the new entity 
upon transfer and that unsecured creditors must be paid before 
stockholders could receive property from the new entity.48  The 
Court further noted that the property received by the new 
company was “property out of which the creditors were entitled 
to be paid before the stockholders could retain it for any purpose 
whatever.”49  Thereby, Boyd announced a “fixed principle”50 that 
 
45 Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 23, at 397.  
46 See, e.g., Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.), 
634 F.3d 79, 99 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that the Supreme Court “finally set down the 
‘fixed principle’ that we now call the absolute priority rule” in N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 507 (1913).); Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 78 (“After Boyd, 
reorganizations would never be the same.”). The term “absolute priority rule” 
originated in the article Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holders in 
a Corporate Reorganization by James C. Bonbright and Milton M. Bergerman. 28 
COLUM. L. REV. 127 (1928). As discussed below, Boyd did not adopt the absolute 
priority rule, but, rather, what is termed the “fair offer” standard. See infra note 53 
and accompanying text. Thereby, Boyd engendered debate as to whether its 
articulated standards required a senior class be paid in full before any value could 
be distributed to a junior class—that is, an “absolute priority rule”—or merely 
required that a senior class receive payment or property of greater value than that 
received by a junior class—that is, a “relative priority rule.” See Haines, supra note 
26, at 401–02; Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 82. This debate was resolved in 
Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., with the Supreme Court’s statement that 
“fair and equitable” are “words of art which . . . had acquired a fixed meaning 
through judicial interpretations”: “the absolute or full priority doctrine of the Boyd 
case . . . .” 308 U.S. 106, 115, 123 (1939). The Court confirmed its upholding of the 
absolute priority rule two years later in Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 
312 U.S. 510 (1941). Nevertheless, the standard adopted in Boyd substantively 
mirrors the absolute priority rule codified in 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(2) (West 2011). 
See Edward S. Adams, Toward a New Conceptualization of the Absolute Priority 
Rule and Its New Value Exception, 1993 DET. C.L. REV. 1445, 1455–56 (1993).  
47 228 U.S. 482 (1913).  
48 Id. at 501; see also Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 79 n.62 (“The 
arguments of counsel for the [new entity] make clear that Boyd alleged that the sale 
of the [r]ailroad’s assets to the [new entity] was fraudulent as to his claim against 
the [r]ailroad.”).  
49 Boyd, 228 U.S. at 508. The Court concluded that it did not matter that the 
sale price of the railroad was less than the debt owed to bondholders: 
[T]he question must be decided according to a fixed principle, not leaving 
the rights of the creditors to depend upon the balancing of evidence as to 
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creditors must receive property or payment on account of their 
interests before equity can receive anything on account of its 
interests.51  Under Boyd, this requirement translated to creditors 
receiving a “fair offer.”52  Congress codified Boyd’s concepts of a 
“fair offer” and a “fixed principle” as the fair and equitable 
standard and the absolute priority rule. 
B. Statutory Codification 
The rule announced in Boyd and subsequently honed in 
several Supreme Court cases53 was first included in the 1933 and 
1934 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, which added Sections 
77 and 77B.54  Sections 77 and 77B each required that a court 
find a plan “fair and equitable”55 before confirming it, thereby 
codifying Boyd’s “fair offer” concept.56  In addition, the 
 
whether, on the day of sale, the property was insufficient to pay prior 
encumbrances . . . . If the value of the [rail]road justified the issuance of 
stock in exchange for old shares, the creditors were entitled to the benefit of 
that value, whether it was present or prospective, for dividends or only for 
purposes of control. 
Id. at 507–08.  
50 Case, 308 U.S. at 116. 
51 See Haines, supra note 26, at 401; Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 80–81.  
52 See Haines, supra note 26, at 402; Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 81; see 
also Baird & Jackson, supra note 11, at 744 (“The basic lesson of Boyd . . . is that 
leaping over an intermediate class triggers special scrutiny.”). 
53 See, e.g., Ecker v. W. Pac. R.R. Corp., 318 U.S. 448, 452–53 (1943) (discussing 
valuation); Marine Harbor Props., Inc. v. Mfrs. Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78, 85 (1942) 
(“Under the rule of [Boyd] and [Case], a plan of reorganization would not be fair and 
equitable which in such circumstances admitted the stockholders to participation, 
unless the stockholders made a fresh contribution in money or in money’s worth in 
return for ‘a participation reasonably equivalent to their contribution.’ ” (quoting 
Case, 308 U.S. at 121)); Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 520 (1941) 
(discussing valuation); Case, 308 U.S. at 122 (confirming that Boyd adopted the 
absolute priority rule); Kan. City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Cent. Union Trust Co., 271 
U.S. 445, 454–55 (1926) (articulating what has become known as the “new value 
exception” to the absolute priority rule). 
54 Section 77 applied to railroad corporations and Section 77B applied to other 
corporations. Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 204, § 77, 47 Stat. 1467, 1474; Act of June 7, 
1934, ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911, 912. The original Bankruptcy Act contained no 
provisions for reorganization, and, consequently, no “fair and equitable” principle.  
55 As originally enacted, Section 77 only required that a plan be “equitable.” Act 
of Mar. 3, 1933 § 77(g). After the adoption of Section 77B, in 1935, the words “fair 
and” were added before “equitable.” Act of Aug. 27, 1935, ch. 774, § 77(e)(1), 49 Stat. 
911, 918. 
56 Neither Section 77 nor Section 77B state that claims must be paid according 
to an “absolute priority rule.” Rather, in Case, the Supreme Court held that “fair and 
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Bankruptcy Act’s “fair and equitable” requirement was stricter 
than the Bankruptcy Code’s: it applied to each individual creditor 
regardless of whether the plan was accepted by all classes of 
creditors.57 
Chapter X superseded Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act in 
1938 and remained in effect until the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Code in 1978.58  It similarly required that a plan be 
“fair and equitable” regardless of whether the plan was accepted 
by all classes of creditors.59  And the Supreme Court 
subsequently confirmed that the absolute priority rule equally 
applied to Chapter X.60  In 1938, Congress also added Chapter XI 
to the Bankruptcy Act.  Chapter XI dealt with the reorganization 
of unsecured debt and initially contained the same “fair and 
equitable” requirement as Chapter X.  Reflecting Chapter XI’s 
aim to encourage settlement, Congress deleted the “fair and 
equitable” standard in 1952.61   
The Bankruptcy Code brought sweeping reforms to the field 
of bankruptcy.  It made two significant changes to the application 
of “fair and equitable” and the absolute priority rule.  First, 
drawing upon Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, the fair and 
equitable standard allows for consensual plans that are not “fair 
and equitable” and only applies to classes of creditors.62  This 
 
equitable” as used in these Sections are “words of art” that include the absolute 
priority rule. Case, 308 U.S. at 115, 123. 
57 Section 77 provided that unsecured debts were discharged if “two-thirds in 
amount of such creditors shall have accepted the plan in writing.” Act of Mar. 3, 
1933 § 77(h)(6). Section 77B provided that confirmation required two-thirds of each 
creditor class vote to confirm a plan. Act of June 7, 1934, § 77B(e)(1) (repealed 1938). 
Courts, however, could ignore the creditors’ vote and confirm the plan. See Absolute 
Priority, supra note 11, at 83 n.94. Confirmation discharged “all creditors, secured or 
unsecured.” Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B(g)(3), 48 Stat. 911, 920 (repealed 
1938); see also Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 88 n.124 (noting that individual 
creditors could challenge a plan based on the “fair and equitable” requirement, 
allowing individual creditors to “bargain for every last dollar of going concern 
value”); Pachulski, supra note 10, at 938. 
58 The Chandler Act was adopted on June 22, 1938. Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 
Stat. 883 (1938). Chapter X was codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 501–676 (1976) (repealed 
1978). 
59 11 U.S.C. § 621(2) (1976) (repealed 1978).  
60 Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 530–31 (1941). 
61 Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 579, § 35, 66 Stat. 420, 433.  
62 Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a), § 1129(b) only applies if a class of impaired 
creditors or interest holders does not accept a plan. 11 U.S.C.A § 1129(a)(8) (West 
2011); see also Booth, supra note 15, at 79 (“[S]ection 1129(a) harks back to Chapter 
XI . . . .”). 
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relaxation of the strict requirement of Chapter X that a plan 
must be “fair and equitable” as to each individual creditor 
stemmed from a desire to encourage deal making and settlement 
with debtors.63  In place of the absolute priority rule, individual 
creditors receive the “best interests of creditors” test, thus 
ensuring that each creditor recovers at least the liquidation value 
of its claim, but allowing excess going concern value to be 
distributed to classes of creditors based on negotiations amongst 
themselves and with the debtor.64   
Second, drawing upon Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 
Section 1129(b) formally articulates the absolute priority rule.65  
Section 1129(b)(2) provides three distinct, but substantively 
similar requirements of what is “fair and equitable”: one for 
secured classes, one for unsecured classes, and one for classes of 
interest.66  Moreover, the text of Section 1129(b)(2) makes the 
absolute priority rule a mandatory, but not sufficient, condition 
to finding that a plan is “fair and equitable.”67  The term 
“includes,” which the Bankruptcy Code specifically states is open-
ended,68 grants courts the ability to and almost demands that 
they continue to develop what constitutes Boyd’s “fair offer.”   
 
 
 
63 See, e.g., Richard F. Broude, Cramdown and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code: The Settlement Imperative, 39 BUS. LAW. 441, 443 (1984) (“Early in the 
process, most of the knowledgeable commentators on bankruptcy concluded that, if 
not abandoned completely, the absolute priority rule should be modified in major 
respects. The importance of deal-making in the reorganization process was 
recognized.”).  
64 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(7); see also Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 88 
(“Once the creditor received its liquidation value, the [Bankruptcy] Code allocated 
the surplus of going concern value over liquidation value by democratic vote within 
and among classes of creditors.”). 
65 See Booth, supra note 15, at 79 (“[S]ection 1129(b) [harkens back] to Chapter 
X.”). 
66 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(2).  
67 Id. at § 1129(b)(2) (“[T]he condition that a plan be fair and equitable with 
respect to a class includes the following requirements . . . .” (emphasis added)); see, 
e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 23, at 417–18 (“The structure of the clause 
invites us to see the specific requirement that equityholders receive nothing on 
account of their prior interest as an integral component of a ‘fair and equitable’ 
plan . . . . However much judges continue to refine the ‘fair and equitable’ standard, 
they cannot return to a regime of relative priority.”); Cram Down II, supra note 12, 
at 230. 
68 11 U.S.C. § 102(3) (2006) (noting that “includes” is “not limiting”); see also 
supra note 12. 
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Legislative history further makes clear that Section 1129(b) 
requires that a court consider more than the absolute priority 
rule when determining if a plan is “fair and equitable.” 
Overall, Congress crafted Section 1129(b) with the aim to 
moderate the effects of Chapter X’s strict application of the 
absolute priority rule, but still retain the core insights of the “fair 
offer” concept that led to the “fair and equitable” principle.  The 
Report of the Bankruptcy Commission (“Report”), delivered in 
1973, significantly influenced Congress’s initial draft of the bill 
that would become the Bankruptcy Code.69  The Report 
essentially proposed to gut the absolute priority rule.  It 
recommended that broad discretion be given to bankruptcy 
courts to allow equity to receive a portion of the debtor’s going 
concern value even if creditors were not paid in full,70 and that 
individual shareholders be permitted to participate in the 
reorganized company if the court determined they would make 
an “essential” contribution.71  The Report engendered strong 
criticism and heated debate.72  Taking this criticism and the 
compromises reached among the business, academic, and 
government sectors into account,73  Congress considerably 
tempered the Report’s recommendation.  
The House submitted the first draft of what would become 
Section 1129(b).  The House’s initial attempt contained the 
simple statement that a court could confirm a plan “if such plan 
is fair and equitable with respect to all classes except any class 
that has accepted the plan.”74  Before being sent to the Senate, 
 
69 COMM’N. ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON 
THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1 (1973). 
Part II contains the Commission’s proposed bill. Id. pt. 2. 
70 Id. pt. 2, at 242.  
71 Id. at 258; see also Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 87 n.117 (discussing 
the H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137). 
72 See, e.g., Walter J. Blum & Stanley A. Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine 
in Corporate Reorganizations, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 651, 651–52 (1974); Victor Brudney, 
The Bankruptcy Commission’s Proposed “Modifications” of the Absolute Priority 
Rule, 48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 305, 308 (1974) (“[T]he Commission both proclaims its 
attachment to the absolute priority rule and proposes effectively to abolish the 
rule.”); Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 87–88 nn.118–120 (citing statements of 
representatives from the business, academic, and government sectors); Note, The 
Proposed Bankruptcy Act: Changes in the Absolute Priority Rule for Corporate 
Reorganizations, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1786, 1786–87 (1974). 
73 See Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 88. 
74 As initially introduced, § 1129(b) of H.R. 6 read: 
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the House revised its draft to define “fair and equitable” 
treatment without using the words “fair and equitable” but, 
rather, by listing multiple examples of what constituted a “fair 
and equitable” plan, including that a plan must satisfy the 
absolute priority rule.75  The House described its final submission 
as a “partial codification” of the absolute priority rule and as 
focused on allocating the going concern value of a debtor to 
creditors.76  
The Senate’s input led to important changes to the House’s 
bill, which were included in the enacted Section 1129(b).  The 
final version effectively combined the initial and final version of 
the House’s bill.  The first subsection explicitly incorporated the 
words “fair and equitable,” harkening back to the House’s initial 
draft, and the second subsection provided three examples of what 
is “fair and equitable,” adopting a portion of the House’s 
definitions of “fair and equitable.”77  Congress made clear that 
the second subsection’s examples were not an exhaustive list of 
what constituted “fair and equitable” treatment:  “[M]any of the 
factors interpreting ‘fair and equitable’ . . . , which were 
explicated in the description of section 1129(b) in the House 
report, were omitted from the House amendment . . . . [T]he 
 
(b) If all of the requirements of subsection (a) of this section other than 
paragraph (8) are met with respect to a plan, the court, on request of the 
proponent of such plan, shall confirm such plan notwithstanding such 
paragraph if such plan is fair and equitable with respect to all classes 
except any class that has accepted the plan and that is comprised of claims 
or interests on account of which the holders of such claims or interests will 
receive or retain under the plan not more than would be so received or 
retained under a plan that is fair and equitable with respect to all classes. 
H.R. 6, 95th Cong. § 1129(b) (as initially introduced Jan. 4, 1977). 
75 H.R. 6, 95th Cong. § 1129(b) (as introduced in Mar. 21, 1977); H.R. 7330, 95th 
Cong., § 1129(b) (as introduced in May 23, 1977); H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. § 1129(b) (as 
introduced in July 11, 1977); and H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. § 1129(b) (as introduced in 
Sept. 8, 1977).  
76 HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. 
NO. 95-595, at 223, 414 (1977) (“[C]reditors are entitled to be paid according to the 
going-concern value of the business.”). 
77 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 32,350 (1978). Despite these 
changes, the statements in the House’s committee report retain their vitality: “[I]n 
lieu of a Conference Report, [Congress] read virtually identical statements into both 
the House and Senate records on the bill. As noted at the time, Congress believed 
that this procedure imbued such remarks with ‘the effect of being a conference 
report.’ ” Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 89 n.131 (citations omitted) (quoting 
124 CONG. REC. 32,391 (1978) (statement of Rep. Rousselot)).  
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deletion is intended to be one of style and not one of substance.”78  
Omitted concepts include the requirements that no creditor 
receive more than its non-bankruptcy entitlement, that no senior 
class receive more than 100 percent of its claims if there is a 
dissenting class, that a senior dissenting class be compensated if 
it loses priority relative to a junior class, and that no “worthless 
securities” be issued.79  Most importantly, this list demonstrates 
“the open texture of the statute,”80 inviting courts to extrapolate 
from legislative history and case law what amounts to a “fair and 
equitable” plan.  
II. FUNCTION AND TRADITIONAL APPLICATION OF THE ABSOLUTE 
PRIORITY RULE 
As evident by its historical and legislative underpinnings, at 
its core, the absolute priority rule is about fraudulent 
conveyance.81  It protects creditors by guaranteeing that a court 
will not confirm a plan that subordinates their claims to the 
benefit of the debtor’s equity holders without the creditors’ 
consent.  Consequently, it reassures creditors that they will 
receive all available going concern value up to the amount of 
their claims unless they agree otherwise.  Only once all creditors’ 
claims are satisfied in full can a plan allocate any remaining 
going concern value elsewhere.82  The absolute priority rule 
thereby prevents equity holders from taking advantage of any 
insider status or colluding with senior creditors to get rid of 
intermediate claimants.  If such a rule did not exist, as 
manifested by the railroad reorganizations that gave rise to the 
rule, senior creditors and equity holders—who also may be 
management—or other junior claimants seemingly could agree to 
give intermediate creditors’ property to equity holders or other 
 
78 124 CONG. REC. 34,006 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); see also id. at 
32,407 (statement of Rep. Edwards); Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 89 
(“[C]ourts were not to exclude other components and interpretations.”). 
79 Cram Down II, supra note 12, at 231–44; Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 
90; Pachulski, supra note 10, at 944. 
80 Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 90.  
81 See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 11, at 746 (noting that the type of 
transaction that gave rise to the absolute priority rule “is viewed as a conveyance 
that, by preferring holders of equity interests over creditors, violates the payout 
norms implicit in the debtor-creditor relation”).  
82 See supra note 11. 
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junior claimants without these creditors’ consent.83  By 
prohibiting such conveyances, the absolute priority rule 
“vindicate[s] the reasonable expectations formed by claimants 
when their investments or loans were made”84 and mitigates “the 
danger inherent in any reorganization plan proposed by a 
debtor . . . that the plan will simply turn out to be too good a deal 
for the debtor’s owners.”85  It likewise upholds the Bankruptcy 
Code’s fundamental goal of ensuring that debtors provide for 
creditors as much as possible through payment or other 
property.86 
The absolute priority rule also grants creditors, particularly 
unsecured creditors,87 a crucial negotiation tool.  Stripped of the 
ability to demand that debtors treat them “fair and equitable” via 
the absolute priority rule, unsecured creditors lose one of their 
only and perhaps most valuable bargaining chips.88  Unsecured 
 
83 But see Baird & Jackson, supra note 11, at 788–89 (arguing that “[o]ne of the 
attractions of the Boyd rule at first meeting is that it appears to respond to a freeze-
out problem that neither non-bankruptcy law nor market sales can prevent,” but 
that “the presence of owners junior to the residual owner [i.e., creditors] who would 
have a right to assets of the firm in absence of default . . . does not require a special 
set of rules”). 
84 Falcon Capital Corp. S’holders v. Osborne (In re THC Fin. Corp.), 679 F.2d 
784, 785 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting In re U.S. Fin., Inc., 648 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir. 
1980)). 
85 Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 
434, 444 (1999).  
86 See, e.g., Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 725 (2011) (noting 
that one of the purposes of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 was “to ensure that [debtors] repay creditors the maximum 
they can afford” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt. 1, p. 2 (2005) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); United Savs. Assoc. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 
Ltd. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.), 808 F.2d 363, 373 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(“A principal goal of the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code is to 
benefit the creditors of the Chapter 11 debtor by preserving going-concern values 
and thereby enhancing the amounts recovered by all creditors.”); Douglas G. Baird & 
Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse 
Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in 
Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 103 (1984) (theorizing that the foremost goal of 
bankruptcy is to enhance creditors’ collection efforts); Warren, supra note 11, at 12–
13 (articulating “the principal reason for a reorganization” as “to enhance return to 
the creditors and to increase the opportunity for reorganization of the business”). 
87 Secured creditors have other negotiation tools at their disposal, such as the 
§ 1111(b) election. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1111(b) (West 2011).  
88 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp. 
(In re Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp.), 282 B.R. 444, 453 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002) 
(noting that creditors who are unable to assert the absolute priority rule are “in an 
unusually disadvantaged negotiating position”); Raymond T. Nimmer, Negotiated 
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creditors are less able to object to valuation of the debtor as a 
going concern and to argue that going concern value is being 
allocated—either explicitly or covertly—away from the unsecured 
creditors to whom it belongs.89  This has the potential to skew the 
loss allocation system embodied in the Bankruptcy Code and to 
disrupt the baseline from which negotiations start and return 
during a bankruptcy proceeding.90  Though this baseline affects 
public companies and close corporations differently, it uniformly 
thwarts attempts to divert value from senior claimants to junior 
claimants—most typically owners—without the senior claimants’ 
consent. 
A. General Application to For-Profit Companies 
As an initial matter, it is important to understand that the 
going concern value of a reorganizing company is available for 
distribution to creditors before equity holders.91  If the 
reorganizing company instead were liquidated either through a 
Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 proceeding, the debtor-in-possession or 
trustee would sell the bankruptcy estate more or less piece-meal 
and disburse any recovery according to the Bankruptcy Code’s 
priority scheme.92  One of the main benefits of reorganization is 
that reconstituting a company as a whole through a bankruptcy 
proceeding plan may preserve value that likely would be lost 
during a liquidation.93  As theorized by Professor Elizabeth 
 
Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Priority and New Value Contributions, 
36 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1038 (1987).  
89 See Nimmer, supra note 88, at 1038 (“[T]he [fair and equitable] standard 
permits the debtor to confirm a plan of reorganization and the owners to retain 
control despite dissent of a class of creditors so long as the plan meets the applicable 
financial test.”). 
90 See id. at 1038–39 (noting that the fair and equitable standard “involve[s] loss 
allocation” and that it “create[s] a baseline below which the debtor’s reorganization 
plan cannot be taken”); Omer Tene, Revisiting the Creditors’ Bargain: The 
Entitlement to the Going-Concern Surplus in Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 
19 BANKR. DEV. J. 287, 354 (2003) (“Bankruptcy is a legal forum for bargaining and 
negotiation among various classes of investors in a financially distressed firm under 
the auspices of a federal court.”).  
91 The filing of a bankruptcy petition creates a bankruptcy estate. This estate 
becomes the legal and equitable owner of all property of the pre-bankruptcy 
company, including “control and ownership of the business and its going-concern 
value.” Warren, supra note 11, at 11. 
92 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 507 (West 2011).  
93 See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the fundamental goals of 
bankruptcy); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1100.01 (16th ed. 2010) ( “[C]ontinued 
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Warren, when a court confirms the reorganizing debtor’s 
bankruptcy plan, the entirety of the bankruptcy estate effectively 
is “sold” to the post-reorganization company.94  This sale includes 
the going concern value of the reorganized company, which 
remains available for distribution to creditors prior to equity 
holders.95   
Three distinct entities take part in a reorganization: the pre-
bankruptcy company, the bankruptcy estate, and the post-
reorganization company.96  These separate entities necessarily 
are overseen by discrete management teams, even if the actual 
individuals do not differ.  As supervisors of the bankruptcy 
estate, during the pendency of a Chapter 11 reorganization case, 
management works to maximize the sale price of the 
reorganizing company and then offers the resulting bundle of 
real, personal, and intangible property held by the bankruptcy 
estate to the owners of the post-reorganization company.97  The 
price paid may take the form of debt satisfaction and other 
contributions, but it nonetheless results in the post-
reorganization company’s purchasing the bankruptcy estate, 
which includes control and ownership of the reorganized 
company and the business’s going concern value.98  Because the 
sale of the bankruptcy estate is governed by the Bankruptcy  
 
 
 
 
 
operation can save the jobs of employees, the tax base of communities, and generally 
reduce the upheaval that can result from termination of a business.”).  
94 See Warren, supra note 11, at 11. 
95 See id. at 11–12; Baird & Jackson, supra note 11, at 745 (“Where the firm 
continues, the general creditors, but for the restructuring, might have something of 
value that the restructuring takes away and gives to the shareholder. Even though 
the firm will likely not be able to pay off the [creditors], the possibility that the firm 
will do much better than expected makes the general creditors’ right to reach the 
assets of the firm before the shareholders worth something.”).  
96 The concept of three entities being involved in a reorganization is proposed by 
Professor Warren: “The debtor gives way to the bankruptcy estate at the time of the 
initial filing, the estate gives way to the post-bankruptcy entity on confirmation of a 
plan, and the post-bankruptcy business survives the confirmation.” Warren, supra 
note 11, at 12.  
97 See id. at 12 (“The [debtor-in-possession] reshapes the business through 
assumption and rejection of contracts, setting aside voidable preferences, dropping 
unprofitable ventures and pursuing new business plans.”).  
98 See id.; 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (2006).  
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Code’s priority scheme, unless the relevant parties agree 
otherwise, distribution of the purchase price should go to 
creditors ahead of equity holders and other junior claimants.99 
Against this backdrop stands the absolute priority rule.  
Because Chapter 11 and the absolute priority rule were designed 
for larger companies with equity,100 in the typical for-profit 
company case, the rule’s application is easily summarized:  
A rule that prohibits old equity from retaining any interest in 
the post-bankruptcy business on account of its earlier interest 
in the pre-bankruptcy debtor simply restates the rules creating 
the estate: upon filing, the bankruptcy estate owns all interests, 
legal and equitable, of the pre-bankruptcy debtor.  No one 
retains any interest in property of the estate—not the secured 
creditors, not the unsecured creditors, and not the old owners of 
the estate.  Creditors may file claims for payment and payout 
from the estate which will be determined according to detailed 
statutory provisions.  Old owners may come back to claim 
control only with the consent of creditors or if the creditors are 
paid in full.  No legal rights carry through from any 
relationships with the pre-bankruptcy debtor to relationships 
with the post-bankruptcy company.101 
Indeed, the absolute priority rule mirrors and thereby 
supports the structure and principles of reorganization outlined 
above.  Given the unambiguous statutory mandate that senior 
claimants be paid in full before junior claimants receive any 
payment or property on account of their claims,102 combined with 
courts’ interpretation of the term “interest” as specifically 
referencing equity,103 courts universally apply the absolute 
priority rule to for-profit companies and reject reorganization 
plans which propose to allocate property to equity holders 
without paying creditors in full.104  Questions as to the rule’s 
 
99 See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 507, 1129(a) (West 2011); Baird & Jackson, supra note 11, 
at 745 (“[The general creditors’] objection . . . goes to the shareholder’s recapture of 
an interest in the firm . . . . [T]he general creditors should be able to object if the old 
shareholder recovers something over which the general creditors have a prior claim 
and does so by means of a transaction in which the general creditors have no 
voice.”). 
100 See Nimmer, supra note 88, at 1056.  
101 Warren, supra note 11, at 13. 
102 See supra note 11; 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b) (West 2011).  
103 See supra note 16.  
104 See, e.g., Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 202 (1988) 
(“Under current law, no Chapter 11 reorganization plan can be confirmed over the 
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application predominantly arise when old equity holders seek to 
retain an interest in the reorganized company without paying 
creditors in full, but offer to contribute new capital to the 
reorganized company.  If old equity holders supply a “new” and 
“substantial” contribution that is “necessary for an effective 
reorganization,” “reasonably equivalent” in value to their 
retained interest, and in the form of “money or money’s worth,” 
courts generally will allow old equity holders to receive 
ownership in the reorganized company.105  This scenario has 
become known as the “new value exception” or “new value 
corollary” to the absolute priority rule and has generated 
scholarly debate principally around the existence of a true 
“exception” and valuation of the contributed capital.106   
 
creditors’ legitimate objections . . . if it fails to comply with the absolute priority 
rule.”); In re Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d 507, 508–09 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(upholding denial of plan confirmation where plan proposed to distribute warrants 
to equity holders over the objection of a class of unsecured creditors not paid in full 
pursuant to the plan); Coltex Loop Cent. Three Partners v. BT/SAP Pool C Assocs. 
(In re Coltex Loop Cent. Three Partners), 138 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding 
denial of plan confirmation where plan proposed to allow equity to retain interests in 
the reorganized limited partnership and to pay unsecured creditors ten percent on 
their claims); Liberty Nat’l Enters. v. Ambanc La Mesa Ltd. P’ship. (In re Ambanc 
La Mesa Ltd. P’ship.), 115 F.3d 650, 652 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that partnership’s 
proposed plan violated absolute priority rule where creditors were not paid in full 
and equity holders retained interests in excess of contributions these holders made 
to the reorganized partnership); In re Woodbrook Assocs., 19 F.3d 312, 316, 322 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (upholding finding that real estate limited partnership’s proposed plan 
violated the absolute priority rule). 
105 For a discussion of these criteria, see Ralph A. Peeples, Staying In: Chapter 
11, Close Corporations and the Absolute Priority Rule, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 78–99 
(1989) and Warren, supra note 11, at 43–44. For a discussion of the minority of 
courts holding that this “exception” or “corollary” to the absolute priority rule did not 
survive the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, see Warren, supra note 11, at 36, 
39–40. Most recently, in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 
North LaSalle Street Partnership, the Supreme Court assumed that the “exception” 
or “corollary” did survive the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, though the 
Supreme Court declined to rule on the precise question. 526 U.S. 434, 435 (1999). 
106 See, e.g., Adams, supra note 46, at 1450 (discussing how to ensure that equity 
holders “contribute the fair market price for the interests they are retaining”); 
Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 124 (concluding that “a new value exception to 
the absolute priority rule simply does not exist”); Warren, supra note 11, at 41 
(arguing that the Bankruptcy Code allows equity to participate in a reorganized 
debtor even if creditors have not been paid in full based upon the “bargain . . . old 
equity proposes to purchase control of the post-reorganization business”); see also 
203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 444–49 (discussing the history of the “ ‘new value 
corollary’ (or ‘exception’)”). 
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B. Specific Application to Close Corporations 
Owners of close corporations often encounter problems with 
the absolute priority rule and retaining interests in the 
reorganized entity.107  Their interaction with the rule highlights 
one side of the issues that arise when courts confront the 
absolute priority rule in non-traditional contexts.  As developed 
in Part V of this Article, contrasting these dilemmas with the 
impediments courts have found in applying the absolute priority 
rule to nonprofits helps illustrate how the core tenets of the rule 
are relevant to all nonprofit reorganizations. 
To satisfy the absolute priority rule, either a reorganization 
plan can give claimholders of the objecting class “property of a 
value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed 
amount of such claim,”108 or the plan proponent can demonstrate 
 
107 Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”), owners of sole proprietorships who filed Chapter 
11 petitions as individual debtors also anticipated encountering similar problems 
with the absolute priority rule as outlined in this sub-part. In BAPCPA, Congress 
amended § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code—the absolute priority rule as 
applicable to unsecured creditors—to provide that a plan of reorganization is fair 
and equitable if “the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of 
such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or 
interest any property, except that in a case in which the debtor is an individual, the 
debtor may retain property included in the estate under section 1115.” Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
§ 321(c)(2), 119 Stat. 23, 95 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) 
(West 2011)) (emphasis added). As stated by one commentator: “it appears that 
Congress intended the § 1129(b)(2) exception to ameliorate the harsh effects that the 
absolute priority rule had on individual Chapter 11 debtors [, such as sole 
proprietors,] by permitting the retention of certain property of the estate in 
exchange for satisfying the § 1129(a)(15) requirement to pay future disposable 
income or ‘sweat equity’ into the plan.” Michael P. Coury, Sweat Equity Redux: Does 
the Absolute Priority Rule Survive for Individual Chapter 11 Cases?, NORTON 
BANKR. L. ADVISER, Feb. 2011, at 1, 3. 
Since the enactment of BAPCPA, courts addressing absolute priority claims in the 
context of plans proposed by Chapter 11 individual debtors have produced split 
decisions regarding whether Congress intended the complete abrogation of the 
absolute priority rule for Chapter 11 individual debtors by way of this amendment. 
Some courts hold that the rule does not apply to these debtors. See, e.g., In re Shat, 
424 B.R. 854, 856 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010); In re Roedemeier, 374 B.R. 264, 276 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 2007); In re Tegeder, 369 B.R. 477, 478 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2007). 
Other courts hold that § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)’s exception only includes property added to 
the bankruptcy estate by § 1115 and, thus, the absolute priority rule applies to pre-
petition property. See, e.g., In re Mullins, 435 B.R. 352, 359–60 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 
2010); In re Gelin, 437 B.R. 435, 442–43 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010); In re Gbadebo, 431 
B.R. 222, 229–30 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2010). 
108 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i) (West 2011). 
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that holders of junior claims or interests will not receive 
anything under the plan.109  If a public company does not have 
enough cash to pay the claims of an objecting class in full, the 
company’s plan can provide that the debtor will issue and 
distribute securities, such as stock, in the reorganized company 
to fulfill the remainder of the claims.  Equity holders can then 
receive the same or other securities, thereby retaining interest in 
the reorganized company.110   
This distribution method, however, is unavailable to close 
corporations, which cannot offer creditors a liquid ownership 
stake in the reorganized company.  Instead, owners of troubled 
close corporations, who often are the directors and key employees 
of these entities, must find a new source of “money or money’s 
worth” to contribute to the reorganized entity if they want to 
retain ownership of their business.  The absolute priority rule, 
notwithstanding the “new value exception,” prevents owners of 
close corporations from reorganizing their businesses without the 
consent of creditors more often than owners of public 
companies.111 
Courts and commentators have long lamented the divergent 
results of the application of the same rule to different for-profit 
entities.112  In particular, they point to the unique role owners 
serve in close corporations, particularly limited partnerships and 
other similar entities, and to the problems these owners face in 
attracting investors.113  Taken together, they suggest that the  
 
 
109 Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
110 See Peeples, supra note 105, at 76 (“Although difficult to value in advance, 
the securities can at least be sold or traded by the holders of the claims. Thus, the 
managers of a public company can avoid having to confront the danger of 
eliminating the old equity owners.”). 
111 Perhaps because of this result, empirical research demonstrates “that in 
small business cases, the owner/operator tends to retain control through a 
consensual plan while discharging some debt.” Warren, supra note 11, at 17.  
112 Decades before the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court 
noted that the absolute priority rule had the potential to preclude reorganizing close 
corporations from retaining the owners and managers best equipped to run the 
reorganized entity. See Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 117 (1939); In 
re Wabash Valley Power Ass’n (Wabash II), 72 F.3d 1305, 1314 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[I]n 
recognition of the fact that prior owners may sometimes be the best ‘buyers’ of a 
reorganized corporation, courts are reluctant to squeeze the old owners out 
entirely.”); see also Nimmer, supra note 88, at 1068–81; Peeples, supra note 105, at 
77. 
113 See supra note 112; Warren, supra note 11, at 15–16. 
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absolute priority rule be relaxed in these instances to allow 
owners to retain an interest in—and thereby control of—the 
reorganized entity even if creditors are not paid in full.114   
For instance, commentators recommend that a “best efforts” 
standard similar to that applicable to Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 
proceedings be applied to close corporations and similar 
entities.115  Owners could remain in control, but they would need 
to use their “best efforts” to allocate all available funds to 
repaying creditors.  As with Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 plans, 
this standard would balance the rights of creditors to payment 
with the benefit of allowing those individuals best able to 
increase payment to creditors to manage the reorganized 
business.116  Moreover, application of the “best efforts” standard 
seemingly would comport with the underlying tenets of the 
absolute priority rule.  Though old owners may retain an interest 
in the reorganized business in order to maintain management 
control, creditors would receive all going concern value of the 
reorganized entity until they were paid in full before the old 
owners could be allocated any value.117 
Regardless, at present, unless the owners of close 
corporations reach a consensual agreement with creditors, the 
absolute priority rule operates and the owners may not retain an 
interest in their reorganized businesses unless creditors are paid 
in full or the owners contribute “money or money’s worth” equal 
to their retained interest.118  As detailed in the next Part of this 
Article, because nonprofit entities typically lack “owners” akin to 
 
114 See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 88, at 1050–51; Peeples, supra note 105, at 95. 
115 See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 88, at 1070–81; Peeples, supra note 105, at 
103–07.  
116 See Nimmer, supra note 88, at 1070 (“The ‘best effort’ model is a rule of 
debtor protection based on equitable and financial effects. The rule benefits the 
individual who makes an effort, but ensures that the creditors receive what is 
realistically available from the debtor. It converts the creditor’s contract right to full 
payment into a right to a best effort from the debtor to repay.”). 
117 The main concerns with allowing owners to provide “value” to their 
reorganized companies other than “money or money’s worth” are (1) that other types 
of “value,” such as labor and managerial skills, are difficult to quantify; (2) that if 
creditors wanted the owners to remain in control, they would strike a deal with 
them, and courts should not upset the creditors’ decision; and (3) that the unique 
position and insider status of owners of close corporations and similar entities afford 
them too great an ability to depress or skew the going concern value of the 
reorganized entity. See, e.g., Wabash II, 72 F.3d at 1314; Warren, supra note 11, at 
17–18. 
118 See supra note 111. 
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for-profit entities’ equity holders, the few courts that have 
addressed how the absolute priority rule applies to nonprofits 
hold that the rule generally is presumptively satisfied, or in the 
limited circumstances in which it is not, that it applies only when 
the nonprofit’s structure essentially transforms the nonprofit into 
a for-profit for purposes of the rule.119  Consequently, in contrast 
to a close corporation’s owners, who direct and manage the 
business, current case law potentially allows a nonprofit’s 
directors, managers, and members to retain control of the 
nonprofit post-reorganization without a clear requirement that a 
nonprofit’s plan provide as much payment as possible to creditors 
until creditors are paid in full.   
III. THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE’S CURRENT APPLICATION TO 
NONPROFIT ENTITIES 
The few courts that have decided absolute priority claims in 
nonprofit bankruptcies overall hold that the absolute priority 
rule is categorically satisfied by nonprofit entities, except in 
limited circumstances, even if the nonprofit had members and 
those members, along with the nonprofit’s managers and 
directors, retained control of the reorganized nonprofit.  In 
arriving at this conclusion, these courts engaged in a fact-specific 
analysis of the membership and control structure of the nonprofit 
at issue, often trying to squeeze the nonprofit into the inapposite 
framework of Chapter 11’s plan confirmation provisions, and 
sometimes criticizing their inability to apply a key creditor 
protection to the plan at hand.  Many of these cases lack an 
analysis of the retention of going-concern value by managers, 
directors, members, or the nonprofit itself, value which owners 
and the entity would not be allowed to retain if the nonprofit was 
structured more like a for-profit entity.  
There are three main cases addressing absolute priority 
claims in nonprofit bankruptcies.  The first court to opine on the 
issue was the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maine in 
1991.120  A rural electric cooperative filed a Chapter 11 petition 
 
119 Courts often find that the absolute priority rule is categorically satisfied in 
nonprofit reorganizations, which is another way of saying that analysis of the rule is 
unnecessary and that the rule does not apply. 
120 In re E. Me. Electric Coop., Inc., 125 B.R. 329 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991). The first 
court to mention the issue was the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan in 1985. A life-care facility for the elderly filed a Chapter 11 petition and 
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after making a financially burdensome investment.121  Similar to 
other utility cooperatives, the cooperative allocated “patronage 
stock” to its members.122  The cooperative’s proposed plan sought 
to pay those members holding patronage stock a pro rata share of 
approximately $200,000 on account of the stock and a percentage 
return on their membership fees, and to pay unsecured creditors 
less than the full amount of their claims.123  Certain unsecured 
creditors objected to the accompanying disclosure statement, 
arguing that payment on account of the stock and fees violated 
the absolute priority rule.124   
After reviewing the statute under which the cooperative was 
organized and the function of patronage stock, the court 
concluded that the stock constituted the equivalent of an 
ownership interest in the cooperative substantively distinct from, 
and thus junior to, debt and unsecured claims.125  Accordingly, 
 
certain bondholders moved to lift the automatic stay. In re Independence Vill., Inc., 
52 B.R. 715 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985). In support of their motion, the bondholders 
argued that the facility was so insolvent that it could not reorganize. Id. at 726. The 
court found the argument “unpersuasive”: “[The debtor] is a non-profit corporation. 
It has no shareholders, hence there are no interests inferior to the unsecured 
creditors. Thus there should be little difficulty with the absolute priority rule . . . . 
Thus a severe cramdown of unsecured debt may not be an insurmountable problem 
in a plan of reorganization.” Id. (citations omitted). 
121 In re E. Me. Electric Coop., 125 B.R. at 331. 
122 Id. at 332. Patronage stock—also called “patronage capital”—refers to a 
portion of excess revenues of a utility that is collected by the cooperative to smooth 
fluctuations in its expenses: “Because of the difficulty of anticipating exactly what 
the costs of producing power will be, utilities sometimes collect excess revenues . . . . 
Patronage capital . . . refers to a portion of this excess revenue which [the 
cooperative’s bylaws] allow it to retain in order to cover fluctuations in production 
costs and to make capital expenditures without having first to raise rates and 
accumulate the necessary funds.” Wabash II, 72 F.3d at 1315–16. The cooperative 
eventually must repay these excess revenues to members. Thus, the cooperative’s 
bylaws provide that members are allocated patronage stock according to their 
respective purchases of energy. The cooperative’s board determines the timing of 
repayment on the patronage stock at their discretion, similar to the payment of 
dividends in a for-profit corporation. See id. at 1316; In re E. Me. Electric Coop., 125 
B.R. at 332. 
123 In re E. Me. Electric Coop., 125 B.R. at 331–32. 
124 Id. at 334. 
125 Id. at 339. The court predominately focused on the fact that repayment of the 
patronage stock was at the discretion of the cooperative’s directors, which made the 
patronage stock distinct from “claims [that] have one feature in common: there 
exists or may come to exist a set of facts, capable of proof, that will require the 
debtor to encounter liability, whether it chooses to do so or not.” Id. at 338 n.42. In 
contrast, “allocated patronage capital the directors have not voted to retire remains 
an ownership interest.” Id. at 339. 
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the court held that the absolute priority rule precluded members 
from receiving property or payment on account of the stock 
unless creditors were satisfied in full,126 declared the proposed 
plan unconfirmable, and disapproved the disclosure statement.127  
Though a nonprofit, the cooperative’s governing statute and 
documents allowed the court to transform the cooperative’s 
members into the equivalent of for-profit equity holders for the 
purposes of the absolute priority rule, creating one of the limited 
circumstances in which the rule is not categorically satisfied by—
or inapplicable to—a nonprofit.  The proposed plan sought to pay 
the cooperative’s equivalent of equity holders ahead of unsecured 
creditors, giving them money that belonged to unsecured 
creditors, and the court appropriately rejected the scheme. 
Several months later, the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of Indiana found that the absolute priority rule 
was satisfied, via its inapplicability,128 by a plan put forth by 
another struggling electric cooperative with similar “patronage 
capital.”129  The plan provided that unsecured claims would not 
be paid in full and that the cooperative’s members would retain 
control of the reorganized nonprofit.130  Certain creditors 
objected, citing the absolute priority rule.  The court rejected 
their argument, finding that an “equity interest” necessary for 
the rule’s application included two attributes—control and 
sharing in profits—the second of which was not inherent in 
members’ patronage capital because applicable state law 
required any surplus upon liquidation to be escheated to the 
state.  This escheatment precluded members from “any 
profiteering at the creditors’ expense.”131  The court further noted 
that the plan “satisfies the economic underpinnings of the  
 
 
 
 
126 Id. at 339. 
127 Id. at 339–40. The court also held that members did not have any interest in 
their membership fees and, thus, no claim for repayment: “Again, proposing any 
distribution on account of such claims with neither consent nor full payment of 
senior claims creates an unconfirmable plan.” Id. at 339. 
128 See infra note 133. 
129 In re Wabash Valley Power Ass’n (Wabash I), No. 85-2238-RWV-11, 1991 WL 
11004220, at *5 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Aug. 7, 1991). 
130 Id. at *3. 
131 Id. at *60. 
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absolute priority rule because it converts every piece of economic 
property in [the cooperative] into cash to be paid to its 
creditors.”132   
On appeal,133 the Seventh Circuit upheld the bankruptcy 
court’s ruling, identifying three components of an “equity 
interest”—control, profit share, and ownership of corporate 
assets—and similarly highlighting the cooperative’s inability to 
pay profits to members in finding that the plan did not violate 
the absolute priority rule.134  Focusing also on the control 
component of an “equity interest,” the Seventh Circuit analyzed 
the effect of members’ retention of control of the reorganized 
cooperative both on the application of the absolute priority rule 
and, more cursorily, on the fairness of the proposed plan.  It 
concluded that control alone did not amount to an “equity 
interest”135 and that members’ control was necessary and 
 
132 Id. This statement demonstrates that though the court technically found the 
absolute priority rule satisfied, it substantively found the rule inapplicable to the 
cooperative: if the absolute priority rule operated, the court would have had no need 
to state explicitly that its core tenets were satisfied. Also, as discussed below, on 
appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the bankruptcy court’s conclusion. See infra 
notes 135–138 and accompanying text. Later, in confirming a labor union’s 
reorganization plan, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California 
characterized the Seventh Circuit’s ruling as holding “that the Absolute Priority 
Rule did not apply under such circumstances.” In re Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen 
& Helpers Union Local 890, 225 B.R. 719, 736 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1998). 
133 During the interim years, two more bankruptcy courts encountered absolute 
priority objections in the context of nonprofit reorganization. First, in In re 
Whittaker Memorial Hospital Ass’n, , the debtor hospital nonstock, membership 
corporation proposed to pay certain creditors less than the full amount of their 
claims while allowing “a junior class of creditors” to remain in control without 
contributing new value. 149 B.R. 812, 815 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993). The court held 
that the plan did not violate the absolute priority rule because “retaining control 
over the debtor entity” did not give the junior class “anything” and “nothing beyond 
control . . . passe[d] to it.” Id. at 816. 
Second, and in contrast, in In re S.A.B.T.C. Townhouse Ass’n, the debtor nonprofit 
corporation homeowners’ association proposed to pay unsecured creditors a portion 
of the full amount of their claims and to allow association members to retain their 
interests in the reorganized nonprofit. 152 B.R. 1005, 1008 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993). 
Without any analysis, the court assumed that the members’ interests were 
“interests” subject to the absolute priority rule and then proceeded to analyze 
whether the members had contributed “new value.” Id. at 1008–11. Because the 
court found that the members had not contributed “new value,” it held that the plan 
violated the absolute priority rule. Id. at 1011. 
134 In re Wabash Valley Power Ass’n (Wabash II), 72 F.3d 1305, 1315–18 (7th 
Cir. 1995). 
135   
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important.136  Moreover, the Seventh Circuit reiterated that the 
cooperative’s plan, mainly because it allowed its members—for 
whom the cooperative was created and to whom the cooperative 
was most valuable—to remain in control, maximized the going 
concern value of the reorganized nonprofit and, most 
importantly, allocated that value to the cooperative’s creditors.137  
Regardless of whether the absolute priority rule was 
categorically satisfied—or inapplicable—the plan still met the 
underlying goals of the rule and was “fair and equitable” to 
creditors who were saddled with the same “owners” despite not 
being paid in full. 
Six years later,138 in 2001, the Ninth Circuit published the 
next—and last—major decision regarding the absolute priority 
rule’s application to nonprofit entities.139  A local labor union 
affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
(“International”) and the Teamsters Joint Council No. 7 (“JC7”) 
 
The mere fact that the [members of the cooperative] are benefited by [the 
cooperative]’s operation and might be disadvantaged by its demise also 
does not give them an ‘interest’ cognizable in bankruptcy. Employees, 
managers and customers, among others, always have an interest, in the 
broadest sense, in a corporation. The factor which distinguishes these 
parties from stockholders is not ‘control’ per se (managers, after all, have at 
least a limited control) but the ability to make use of that control to 
generate profits or to increase their own share of profits. 
 Id. at 1318–19. 
136 Id. at 1318 (“[S]ince [the cooperative] was specifically designed to supply its 
own Members, their continuation as customers in control of [the cooperative] is a 
means of maximizing the value of the estate for the benefit of creditors.”). 
137 Id. at 1312–13 (“The value of [the cooperative] to its Members exceeds its 
value to any third-party buyer because [the cooperative] is tailored exactly to the 
Members’ requirements . . . . The bankruptcy court found that the [cooperative’s 
proposed plan] provided the maximum amount that [creditors] could possibly obtain. 
It met the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) and was confirmable.”). 
138 In the interim, one more court published an opinion addressing the absolute 
priority rule’s application to nonprofit entities. In Southern Pacific Transportation 
Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., a nonprofit agricultural cooperative 
proposed a plan that would pay holders of patronage stock while paying 
approximately 19% on unsecured claims. 252 B.R. 373, 385 (E.D. Tex. 2000). Relying 
on Wabash II, the cooperative argued that the patronage stock should be 
characterized as debt. The court held that the plan violated the absolute priority 
rule, finding that the patronage stock should be classified as equity based upon an 
analysis of governing state law. Id. at 388–89. Ultimately, the court remanded the 
case to the bankruptcy court to determine whether the new value exception was 
satisfied. Id. at 390. 
139  Sec. Farms v. Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local 890 
(In re Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local 890), 265 F.3d 869 
(9th Cir. 2001). 
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submitted a plan of reorganization that proposed to distribute to 
creditors an amount equal to the equity in the debtor’s real and 
tangible personal property financed through the reorganized 
union’s borrowing against these assets.140  The plan further 
provided that any gain from a sale or refinancing of these assets 
during the five years post-confirmation would be distributed to 
unsecured creditors.141  Certain unsecured creditors objected to 
the plan, contending that the reorganized union should raise 
member dues and/or terminate the union’s affiliations with 
International and JC7, thereby eliminating the cooperative’s “per 
capita tax” obligations to them, in order to increase the amount 
paid to unsecured creditors.142   
These creditors additionally argued that the plan violated 
the absolute priority rule because the union would continue to 
exist and own its property without paying unsecured creditors in 
full.143  As clarified on appeal, they also maintained that 
International had an equity interest in the union by way of a 
provision in its contract with the union that escheated the 
union’s assets to International upon the union’s liquidation.144  
The union’s plan distributed property to International on account 
of its secured and unsecured claims; if International received this 
property, the objecting creditors insisted that International 
provide new value.145   
In addressing the absolute priority rule arguments, the 
bankruptcy court began by noting that  
[i]n the case of a Chapter 11 debtor that is a corporation or 
partnership, the Absolute Priority Rule prevents the 
shareholders or partners from receiving anything on account of  
 
 
140 In re Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local 890, 225 B.R. 
719, 722 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1998). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. “Per capita tax” is the per-member portion of a local labor union’s dues 
that it must remit to the national or international “parent” unions with which it 
affiliates. Severing ties with International and JC7 would have saved the 
cooperative $6.50 per member per month. Id. at 724. The bankruptcy court, and 
later the Ninth Circuit, considered this an argument that the plan was not proposed 
in good faith in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3). In re Gen. Teamsters, 265 F.3d at 
877; In re Gen. Teamsters, 225 B.R. at 722. 
143 In re Gen. Teamsters, 225 B.R. at 735. 
144 In re Gen. Teamsters, 265 F.3d at 872; see also In re Gen. Teamsters, 225 B.R. 
at 736. 
145 In re Gen. Teamsters, 265 F.3d at 872. 
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their interests in the corporation or partnership, and from 
retaining the benefits of such interests, unless all creditors have 
been paid in full . . . .146   
The bankruptcy court then confirmed that the union “is an 
unincorporated nonprofit association . . . whose members have no 
ownership interest in [the union] akin to that of shareholders of a 
corporation or partners of a partnership”147 and that the plan did 
not provide that International would “receive or retain anything 
‘on account of’ its escheat rights . . . .”148  After discussing the 
Seventh Circuit’s opinion, the bankruptcy court concluded that 
the absolute priority rule did not apply to the union’s plan.149  In 
dicta, however, it lamented the uneasy fit of “traditional 
bankruptcy analysis” to nonprofit reorganizations, expressly 
noting that the absolute priority rule’s inapplicability to the 
union’s plan seemed to contradict the fact that the union’s 
members benefited most from the reorganization.150   
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld that bankruptcy court’s 
ruling.  In addressing the dissenting creditors’ absolute priority 
rule arguments, similar to the bankruptcy court, the Ninth 
Circuit discussed the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, noting parallels 
and further distinguishing the union from for-profit entities 
based on the principles of local labor unions and their connection 
with their affiliates that made the local union financially 
independent from its affiliates.151  The Ninth Circuit also found 
 
146 In re Gen. Teamsters, 225 B.R. at 736. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. The bankruptcy court further found that the plan “provides for 
[International] merely to the extent that [International] holds a creditor’s claim.” Id. 
149 “In this case, neither [the union]’s members nor [the union]’s affiliates nor 
anyone else holds any interest in [the union], as that concept is defined by the 
Bankruptcy Code and case law. The Absolute Priority Rule does not, by its terms, 
prohibit a debtor entity from retaining its own assets, and cannot, by its terms, 
apply to a situation such as this where the debtor has no equity security holders.” Id. 
at 737. 
150 Id. Specifically, the bankruptcy court noted the union’s case “presents a 
somewhat anomalous situation whereby [the union]’s members are not the 
proponents of the Plan . . . yet the dues they pay are [the union]’s only source of 
income and the amount of such dues is determined solely by the members—thus, the 
Absolute Priority Rule cannot be applied . . . even though [the members] will reap 
the benefits of reorganization.” Id. The bankruptcy court also determined that the 
plan was proposed in good faith despite not seeking to raise member dues or 
terminate the union’s affiliations. Id. at 738. 
151 “If the International were to be regarded as an equity owner . . . then the 
International’s unwillingness or inability to contribute a sufficient value to ensure 
the [local union]’s reorganization would force the liquidation of the [local union]. 
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that International’s escheatment right was so uncertain and 
remote that it did not have any immediate ownership right in the 
union and, likewise, that the union’s members did not have any 
ownership right in the union.152  Accordingly, none of the three 
indices of an “equity interest” identified by the Seventh Circuit—
control, profit share, and ownership of corporate assets—were 
present for either International or the union’s members, and the 
absolute priority rule did not apply to the union’s plan.153   
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, the closest the 
Ninth Circuit came to discussing whether the plan was “fair and 
equitable” notwithstanding the inapplicability of the absolute 
priority rule was its discussion of the dissenting creditors’ 
argument that the plan should have raised member dues and/or 
terminated the local union’s affiliations.  In upholding the 
bankruptcy court’s determination that the plan was filed in good 
faith despite these omissions, the Ninth Circuit noted that the 
bankruptcy court had found that “the plan represented the 
[union]’s honest effort to satisfy the demands of its creditors.”154  
The Ninth Circuit, however, did not link this finding to a broader 
examination of the fair and equitable standard.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This would in turn destroy the federally protected rights of the workers represented 
by the [local union] in the collective bargaining process . . . . As a consequence of this 
distinction between local and international unions, the [local union] is financially 
independent.” Sec. Farms v. Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, 
Local 890 (In re Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local 890), 265 
F.3d 869, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001). 
152 Id. at 876. 
153 Id. The Ninth Circuit did not explicitly state whether the absolute priority 
rule was inapplicable or satisfied. In discussing the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, 
however, the Ninth Circuit did state that “[i]n the labor [union] context, the absolute 
priority rule makes even less sense than it did in the electric utility context . . . .” Id. 
at 874. This statement suggests that the Ninth Circuit considered the rule to be 
inapplicable. 
154 Id. at 877. 
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Taken together, these three main cases155 demonstrate 
courts’ reasoning in holding the absolute priority rule generally 
inapplicable to nonprofit reorganizations.  Given the express 
language of the absolute priority rule as codified in the 
Bankruptcy Code,156 coupled with courts’ narrow reading of the 
term “interest,”157 this conclusion seems correct.  The absolute 
priority rule, as written expressly and specifically into the 
Bankruptcy Code’s fair and equitable standard, normally does 
not apply to nonprofits because nonprofits do not have “interest” 
holders with characteristics equivalent to for-profit’s equity 
holders.   
Notably missing by and large from these opinions, 
particularly the Ninth Circuit’s opinion,158 however, is the 
recognition that the absolute priority rule is only one facet of the 
fair and equitable standard.  In not acknowledging the 
connection between the absolute priority rule and the fair and 
equitable standard, these courts have created case law that may 
be read to provide that a nonprofit’s reorganization plan need not 
 
155 Since the Ninth Circuit’s decision, two more courts have addressed the 
absolute priority rule in the context of nonprofit reorganizations. First, in In re 
Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital, a “nonprofit public benefit corporation” 
that owned and operated a hospital sought a three-month extension of its exclusive 
period, as debtor-in-possession, to file a plan of reorganization. 282 B.R. 444, 446 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002). The official committee of unsecured creditors objected, stating 
that “unsecured creditors should be allowed to protect themselves by proposing 
competing plans because the nonprofit status of the Hospital blunts the force of the 
absolute priority rule, which usually affords creditors leverage to block plans that 
give value to owners.” Id. at 447. The court acknowledged the validity of the 
argument, stating that the hospital’s unsecured creditors were in a “take-it-or-leave 
dilemma” that counseled against extending exclusivity because the unsecured 
creditors had the most incentive to propose a plan that increased the going concern 
value of the hospital as “every additional dollar is their money.” Id. at 453. 
Second, in In re Save Our Springs (S.O.S.) Alliance, Inc., a certain creditor argued 
that the debtor citizen action group non-profit charitable organization’s 
reorganization plan should not be approved because it violated the absolute priority 
rule. 388 B.R. 202, 209, 244–45 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2008), aff’d, 632 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 
2011). The court disagreed, simply stating that the debtor’s “Plan does not provide 
for equity holders to receive or retain an interest, because the Debtor, as a non-profit 
organization, has no equity holders.” Id. at 245. 
156 See supra note 11. 
157 See supra note 16. 
158 For example, in discussing the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, the Ninth Circuit 
stated that “[i]n the labor relations context, the absolute priority rule makes even 
less sense than it did in the electric utility context . . . .” Sec. Farms v. Gen. 
Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local 890 (In re Gen. Teamsters, 
Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local 890), 265 F.3d 869, 874 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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allocate going concern value of the debtor nonprofit to creditors 
until they are paid in full before that value is accessible to pre-
petition interest holders who resemble a for-profit’s owners—or 
the nonprofit itself—simply because the absolute priority rule, as 
explicitly codified, is inapplicable.  Though justifiable reasons 
may exist for such deviations—as developed in Part VI—these 
courts offered no explanation for the potential departure.  
Moreover, the absolute priority rule has a fuller history than 
these courts have credited it—a history that directly links the 
fair and equitable standard and the absolute priority rule.159  
Those few courts able to transform the nonprofit’s members into 
the equivalent of equity holders unintentionally take advantage 
of this history, grant creditors the baseline protections and 
bargaining position that Chapter 11 assumes them to have, and 
confirm reorganization plans that fully satisfy the requirements 
of Chapter 11.  Indeed, all of the main cases dealing with 
absolute priority claims in the context of nonprofit 
reorganizations involved nonprofits with members.  Not all 
nonprofits have members, which may appear to make the 
absolute priority rule even less applicable to such nonprofits.  
The next part of this Article develops a theory of how the 
absolute priority rule, by way of its history and core principles, 
applies to all reorganizing nonprofits, regardless of whether a 
nonprofit has members or whether those members resemble for-
profit equity holders.   
IV. EXTENDING THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE 
A. Theory 
As recognized in varying degrees by those courts addressing 
absolute priority rule objections in the context of nonprofit 
reorganizations, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code must be 
made to fit these reorganizations.  One critical mandate of 
Chapter 11’s plan confirmation requirements is that all 
distributable going concern value of the reorganizing debtor be 
allocated to creditors until they are paid in full.  Because of the 
way in which the Bankruptcy Code codifies this mandate in the 
absolute priority rule, explicitly stating that only once creditors 
 
159 See supra Part II.B (discussing the statutory codification of the fair and 
equitable standard and absolute priority rule). 
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are paid in full can the debtor’s equity holders retain any value, 
courts overall have thought themselves forced to hold that the 
absolute priority rule—and, with it, possibly its mandate—does 
not apply to reorganizing nonprofits. 
Nevertheless, the absolute priority rule is less about the 
debtor’s equity holders retaining value and more about ensuring 
that a plan of reorganization provides for creditors to the greatest 
extent possible.  What bankruptcy practitioners now know as the 
absolute priority rule originally was the directive developed in 
case law addressing a situation more analogous to nonprofit 
reorganizations than one would think.  Railroads’ owners 
attempted to rid their railroads of unsecured debt while retaining 
ownership and control.160  Upon being presented with such 
schemes, the Supreme Court made three key holdings: (1) that 
all assets of a debtor railroad were held in trust first for the 
payment of the debtor’s creditors;161 (2) that, accordingly, 
property of the old railroad obtained by the new railroad was 
property from which creditors were entitled to be paid before 
owners “could retain it for any purpose whatever,” including for 
the purpose of control;162 and (3) that creditors of railroads in 
particular must not be passed over because railroads were 
“[in]strument[s] of public service.”163  
Two fundamental rules of reorganization emerge from these 
foundational cases: the going concern value of a reorganizing 
debtor belongs to the reorganized entity; and the reorganized 
entity must allocate as much of that value as possible to the 
debtor’s creditors.  These rules possibly gain additional vitality if 
the reorganizing entity serves the public in some capacity—such 
as in the context of nonprofits, which almost by definition 
predominately serve the public.164  Just as the railroad’s owners 
were not allowed to discharge their unsecured debt while 
retaining ownership and control, a nonprofit should not be able to 
 
160 See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. 
161 See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
162 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 508 (1913); see supra notes 48–49 and 
accompanying text (noting that the Supreme Court stated that if there was enough 
value in the railroad to justify issuing new stock, then the railroad’s “creditors were 
entitled to the benefit of that value, whether it was present or prospective, for 
dividends or only for purposes of control,” until creditors were paid in full). 
163 Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co., 174 U.S. 674, 682 (1899); 
see supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
164 See supra note 1 (defining nonprofit). 
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continue in existence without paying its creditors as much as 
possible purely by reorganizing.  And just as with railroads, the 
“peculiar character”165 of nonprofits, especially in relation to the 
Bankruptcy Code, demands that creditors receive the greatest 
possible amount of the nonprofit’s going concern value.   
Statutory codification of these rules did not alter them.  
Congress wrote the characterization of the Supreme Court’s 
holdings as demanding that creditors receive a “fair offer” into 
the Bankruptcy Act as the requirement that a plan be “fair and 
equitable.”166  After codification, the Supreme Court confirmed 
that “fair and equitable” encompassed the absolute priority rule 
as it is thought of today,167 evidencing that the fundamental rules 
developed by case law extend beyond the for-profit context of 
railroad reorganizations covered by the absolute priority rule.  
For example, in a case decided soon after “fair and equitable” was 
added to the Bankruptcy Act, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that 
a debtor’s creditors have “full right of priority” to the debtor’s 
assets.168  
Then, in enacting the Bankruptcy Code, after protracted 
debate and numerous drafts, Congress specifically separated the 
absolute priority rule from “fair and equitable,” making it a sub-
part of the standard.169  Throughout all of Congress’s drafts, the 
absolute priority rule remained an explicitly or implicitly 
necessary, but not sufficient, part of the standard.170  And despite 
recommendations that a reorganizing debtor’s going concern 
value be allocated away from creditors irrespective of whether 
they were paid in full,171 Congress made certain that railroad 
reorganizations’ fundamental rules survived.  For example, in 
commenting on one of its drafts, the House identified the rule 
that all going concern value of a reorganizing debtor be allocated 
 
165 Louisville Trust Co., 174 U.S. at 682. 
166 See supra notes 52–59. 
167 See supra notes 56 & 60. 
168 Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 122 (1939) (quoting Kan. City 
Terminal Ry. Co. v. Cent. Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445, 456 (1926). The entire 
quotation reads: “Whenever assessments are demanded, they must be adjusted with 
the purpose of according to the creditor his full right of priority against the corporate 
assets, so far as possible in the existing circumstances.” Id. 
169 See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
170 See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text. 
171 See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing the COMM’N. ON THE 
BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS 
OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 2 (1973)). 
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first to creditors as one of its guiding principles.172  Similarly, by 
not listing numerous examples of what satisfied the fair and 
equitable standard, Congress created a statute with an “open 
texture” that invites courts to rely on legislative history and case 
law to evaluate a reorganization plan,173 necessarily leading 
courts to look to the fundamental rules that emerge from the 
railroad reorganization cases.174   
The survival of the two fundamental rules through statutory 
codification makes sense.  These rules comport with the primary 
structure and principles of reorganization.  When compared to 
the railroads’ equity receiverships, Chapter 11 reorganization 
adds an intermediate party—the debtor-in-possession.175  
Chapter 11 delegates the responsibilities of the reorganized 
entity to the old entity’s creditors to the debtor-in-possession.  
First, as all going concern value of a debtor is available for 
distribution to creditors before equity holders during liquidation, 
when a debtor reorganizes, that going concern value must remain 
available for distribution to creditors before it can be accessed by 
equity holders.176  Second, the reorganizing debtor—by way of the 
debtor-in-possession—thus has an obligation to propose a plan 
that provides for creditors to the greatest extent possible before 
allocating any going concern value elsewhere.177  
The absolute priority rule mirrors this structure in the 
context of a for-profit reorganization and, accordingly, requires 
that creditors be paid in full before equity holders receive any 
property or payment.  The rule frames the reorganizing debtor’s 
 
172 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
173 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
174 For instance, in a recent decision addressing the absolute priority rule, the 
Second Circuit discussed and relied upon railroad reorganization cases in deciding 
that senior creditors’ “gifting” of shares and warrants to a junior class, although a 
more senior class did not approve the plan and were not paid in full, violated the 
absolute priority rule. Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. 
Am., Inc.), 634 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2011). 
175 See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the three distinct 
entities that take part in a reorganization). 
176 See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
177 See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. The debtor-in-possession also 
must take into consideration other interested parties in the reorganization, such as 
employees. This obligation, however, most often should not require the diversion of 
going concern value otherwise available to creditors because a debtor-in-possession’s 
duty to other parties involves the same considerations implicated in reconstituting 
the debtor as a viable business post-reorganization. For example, in renewing an 
ailing business, the debtor-in-possession will preserve jobs. 
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obligation to creditors this way because the rule was crafted only 
considering for-profit entities.  Even if Congress did not explicitly 
codify the absolute priority rule in the Bankruptcy Code, merely 
leaving the Bankruptcy Act’s “fair and equitable” wording intact, 
none of the courts subsequently applying the rule to for-profit 
reorganizations should have arrived at different results than if 
the courts evaluated the instant plans for their fairness and 
equitableness.   
Equity holders of for-profit entities are the residual owners 
of and ultimately control for-profit entities.  They own all excess 
going concern value, and they rightly should not allow any of that 
value to be allocated elsewhere—such as to expand the 
operations of the reorganized entity—without their consent.  
Indeed, as identified by courts addressing the absolute priority 
rule as applicable to nonprofits, control is a critical hallmark of 
ownership.178  Because of this control, when a for-profit entity 
reorganizes, the threat that equity holders will take too much for 
themselves looms.  Given that creditors are entitled to a 
reorganizing debtor’s assets before equity, absent the explicitly 
codified absolute priority rule, courts still would have been 
obligated to reject plans which proposed to allocate property to 
equity holders without paying creditors in full.   
As concerns the absolute priority rule and fair and equitable 
standard, there is one relevant difference between for-profit and 
nonprofit entities: most nonprofits lack the equivalent of equity 
holders who ultimately direct management’s and the board’s 
business decisions and hold the for-profit accountable if 
management and the board attempts to allocate going concern 
value without the equity holders’ approval.  Instead, a nonprofit’s 
managers, board, and, if applicable, members fill the role of the 
for-profits’ owners, both directing the day-to-day business of the 
nonprofit and making larger decisions regarding its continued 
operation.  In some cases, managers and board oversee the 
nonprofit at the discretion of state or municipal officials.179  In 
other cases, even if a nonprofit has members, members have 
 
178 See supra notes 131 & 153 and accompanying text. 
179 For example, the board of directors of the non-profit Las Vegas Monorail 
Corporation is appointed by the governor of the State of Nevada. History, LAS VEGAS 
MONORAIL, http://www.lvmonorail.com/about/history (last visited Mar. 11, 2012). 
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little control over the nonprofit.180  Thus, in the case of some 
nonprofits, it can be argued that the state, municipality, or part 
of society that benefits from the continued operation of a 
nonprofit is the true “owner” of the nonprofit.  Regardless of 
whether managers, directors, members, or the ultimate overseers 
of a nonprofit hold “interests” in the nonprofit, they become the 
“owners” for the purposes of the absolute priority rule and the 
fair and equitable standard.  Any property that a reorganized 
nonprofit keeps for itself through its reorganization—and thus 
keeps for its managers, directors, members, or broadly for the 
benefit of society—is property that may be allocable to its 
creditors. 
To determine whether a reorganizing nonprofit is assigning 
going concern value to itself that should go to creditors, a court 
merely needs to apply the two fundamental rules that animate 
the fair and equitable standard and the absolute priority rule.  
First, all going concern value of the reorganizing nonprofit not 
necessary to the restructuring is available, first and foremost, to 
its creditors.181  As with for-profit reorganizations, the 
reorganized nonprofit essentially purchases the old nonprofit for 
its going concern value.  The reorganized nonprofit consequently 
continues the operations of the old nonprofit.  Second, if the going 
concern value is less than the amount the old nonprofit owed to 
creditors, the reorganized nonprofit must pay this value to those 
creditors.  Unless a nonprofit has members equivalent to equity 
holders whose “interests” it wants to discharge through 
reorganization, the going concern value almost always should be 
less than creditors’ claims.  Otherwise the nonprofit need not 
reorganize.  Hence, stated generally, if the reorganizing nonprofit 
proposes to preserve going concern value for itself, the nonprofit’s 
proposed plan does not fulfill the underlying principles of the 
absolute priority rule and is not fair and equitable.   
Such a scheme should be readily apparent.  The plan may 
reserve a sum for capital expenditures in excess of the nonprofit’s 
historical major expenditures, provide for salary increases at a 
rate not at the level of previous increases, or decrease member 
dues.  In these scenarios, not only does the reorganized nonprofit 
 
180 For example, many private schools are nonprofit entities. Parents constitute 
the members and hold shares in the nonprofit, but a board of trustees ultimately 
oversees the school. 
181 See supra notes 131 & 153 and accompanying text. 
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survive, but it also benefits from the discharge of its debt, exactly 
as the railroads’ owners attempted to benefit from equity 
receiverships.  As dictated by the principles underlying the 
absolute priority rule, if the nonprofit decides to take advantage 
of reorganization pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, the 
nonprofit’s creditors must be paid in full before the nonprofit can 
better itself.  If not, management and members will be allowed to 
take advantage of their insider status and usher through a plan 
that is simply too good a deal for the nonprofit and themselves. 
The parallel between the application of the principles 
underlying the absolute priority rule to for-profit and nonprofit 
entities is most evident when nonprofits are compared to close 
corporations.  Managers, directors, and members of nonprofits 
strongly resemble owners of close corporations.  These owners 
direct the day-to-day business of their company and have the 
final say on larger decisions regarding its continued operation.  
Unlike managers, directors, and members of nonprofits, however, 
owners of close corporations who cannot find a source of new 
money to contribute to their reorganizing companies are unable 
to retain control of their companies absent creditor consent.182  
Despite the many benefits these owners may bring to their 
reorganized companies, courts strictly apply the absolute priority 
rule to their proposed plans, preventing owners who do not 
contribute new value from retaining any interest unless creditors 
are paid in full.183 
This result starkly contrasts with nonprofit reorganizations.  
Because a nonprofit’s managers, directors, and, if applicable, 
members do not hold traditional ownership stakes in the 
nonprofit, they may continue directing the nonprofit’s operations 
post-reorganization without contributing to the reorganization in 
the same way owners of a close corporation are required to 
contribute.  Indeed, in one of the three main cases dealing with 
nonprofit reorganization and the absolute priority rule, the 
Seventh Circuit even lauded the continued involvement of 
nonprofits’ members in the reorganized nonprofit, stating that 
allowing members to stay in control maximized the going concern 
value of the nonprofit.184  In the context of reorganization of close 
 
182 See supra notes 108–111 and accompanying text. 
183 See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
184 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
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corporations, a court would not credit this kind of intangible 
benefit accruing from management’s involvement in the 
reorganized business to owners who also managed the business.  
If these owner-managers want to reorganize and remain in 
control, they must contribute new capital to the reorganized 
business.185  Thus, if nonprofits were close corporations—which, 
given their size and management structure, many of them 
essentially are186—they would not be reorganizing at all.   
If the directives of the absolute priority rule do not apply to 
reorganizing nonprofits, not only will a nonprofit’s managers, 
directors, and members be allowed to retain control of their 
nonprofit despite not having to contribute new capital, creating 
even more division in how the fair and equitable standard is 
applied to different types of reorganizing entities,187 but also they 
may be able to direct old capital and future revenues—that is, 
going concern value—to the reorganized nonprofit for them to use 
for the betterment of the nonprofit.  Such a result contradicts the 
core of the absolute priority rule.  Nonprofits cannot subordinate 
the claims of their creditors to the benefit of their continued 
operation.   
In the end, it does not matter whether management or 
equity holders are viewed as the “owners” for the purposes of the 
principles underlying the absolute priority rule.  If the 
reorganizing entity proposes a plan that violates the payment 
priority structure among creditors and interest holders, 
allocating going concern value away from senior claimants, to 
equity holders or simply to itself, the plan is not fair and 
equitable.  This is the principle that courts addressing absolute 
priority claims in the context of nonprofit reorganizations only 
marginally acknowledged or completely overlooked.  And this is 
the principle that animates the absolute priority rule and 
warrants its application to all nonprofit reorganizations.  
Regardless of case law that may be read to provide otherwise, 
unless creditors consent, a plan of reorganization, whether 
 
185 See supra notes 113 & 118 and accompanying text. 
186 For example, Save Our Springs (S.O.S.) Alliance, Inc., a nonprofit that sues 
municipalities and developers regarding the use of an aquifer in Texas, filed its 
Chapter 11 petition as a small business debtor. In re Save Our Springs (S.O.S) 
Alliance, Inc., 632 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2011). 
187 See supra note 112 and accompanying text (noting the divergent results of 
the application of the absolute priority rule to public companies and close 
corporations). 
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addressing a for-profit or nonprofit entity, is not fair and 
equitable unless creditors are provided for as much as possible 
until they are paid in full.   
B. Example Applications 
As an initial example, take a nonprofit without members.188  
Assume that the reorganizing nonprofit has one tier of secured 
debt and general unsecured creditors.  Also assume that holders 
of the secured debt are undersecured.  Further assume that the 
nonprofits’ proposed reorganization plan provides that holders of 
the debt will receive a secured note that compensates them in full 
on account of the secured portion of their claim, and that the 
holders of the debt and general unsecured creditors will receive 
approximately 50% on account of their unsecured claims.  Finally 
assume that the plan also allocates $50 million to a general fund 
for expanding the nonprofits’ operations to provide services 
encompassed by the nonprofit’s mission and similar to services 
historically made available, but not previously offered by the 
nonprofit, and that this $50 million would increase the 
distribution to unsecured creditors to approximately 55% on 
account of their unsecured claims.  
This plan is not fair and equitable.  It apportions funds to 
the reorganized nonprofit that allow the nonprofit to expand 
solely by way of the reorganization.  In so allocating, it provides 
$50 million to the nonprofits’ management that they do not need 
to keep the nonprofit afloat post-reorganization.  It is as if the 
managers, directors, and the portion of society that generally 
benefits from the nonprofit’s existence are receiving $50 million 
in dividends.  These funds represent going concern value and 
belong to its unsecured creditors.  Unless unsecured creditors 
consent to the expansion provided for by the plan, the plan 
cannot be confirmed.  Even though the nonprofit has no members 
and, thus, the absolute priority rule as codified is categorically 
inapplicable as against the nonprofit itself retaining going 
concern value, the nonprofit must not be allowed to benefit from 
its reorganization simply because it does not have the equivalent 
 
188 This example is inspired by the first plan of reorganization proposed by the 
Las Vegas Monorail Corporation (“LVMC”). Debtor’s Plan of Reorganization, In re 
Las Vegas Monorail Co., No. 10-10464-bam (Bankr. D. Nev. Jan. 13, 2010), Doc. No. 
516.  
WF_Foohey (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2012  9:12 AM 
2012] CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATION  77 
of equity holders.  When presented with such a scheme, a court 
should read the core principles of the absolute priority rule into 
the open-ended fair and equitable standard and reject the plan.  
If the managers and directors of the reorganized nonprofit 
believe it advantageous to expand the nonprofit’s operations, 
they must look outside the nonprofit for the necessary capital, 
such as taking out a loan that the nonprofit will be able to repay 
with anticipated future charitable gifts or revenues from the 
expansion.  
The rule applies in the same way to nonprofits which courts 
deciding absolute priority claims have encountered: nonprofits 
with members.  A court’s initial inquiry should be into the nature 
of membership.  But even if a court finds that the nonprofit’s 
members are not the equivalent of a for-profit’s equity holders, 
the court has not completed its inquiry into the fair and equitable 
standard.  Take the labor union addressed by the Ninth 
Circuit.189  Assume that the members are properly classified as 
unsecured creditors, as the Ninth Circuit found.190  Also assume 
that in addition to continuing the labor union’s current 
affiliations,191 the plan contemplates affiliating with another 
“parent” union.  Further assume that the reorganizing union 
believes the added affiliation will benefit the union and its 
members, but that the extra affiliation will require the union 
retain an extra $5 per member per month to pay the “per capita 
tax” for the affiliation, thereby increasing its monthly operational 
expenses.  Finally assume that all other provisions of the 
proposed plan remain the same, including that member dues are 
not raised. 
In this example, it is slightly less obvious that the plan is not 
fair and equitable.  The plan merely calls for the reorganized 
labor union affiliating with another “parent” union, which, upon 
initial consideration, seems to fall within the union’s pre-
reorganization operations.192  But adding an affiliation materially 
 
189 See supra notes 139–153 and accompanying text. 
190 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
191 See supra notes 140 and 142 and accompanying text. 
192 When a debtor reorganizes, it is assumed that the debtor-in-possession will 
reconstitute the ailing business primarily by selling and rearranging assets, not 
purchasing new assets. For example, a restaurant may change its fare—and interior 
and exterior decorations—from Mexican to Italian, but it will not reorganize from a 
restaurant into a clothing boutique. Thereby, a business’s overall post-
reorganization operations should reflect its pre-reorganization operations. 
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changes the benefits the union’s members receive.  And it does so 
without requiring that the union find financing for the additional 
affiliation.  Instead, the $5 per member per month must come 
from going concern value otherwise distributable to the union’s 
creditors.  If its members were found to be the equivalent of 
equity holders, it might be clearer that the extra affiliation 
amounts to a distribution to members.  It is as if the union’s 
members each are receiving $5 per month in dividends that they 
are electing to reinvest in the union.  Indeed, the plan provides 
the exact opposite of what creditors objected to—rather than 
increase member dues or terminate affiliations,193 the plan 
effectively expands the pre-reorganization operations of the 
union while leaving dues unchanged, allowing the union’s 
members to improve the union through reorganization.  Unless 
unsecured creditors consent to the expansion, a court cannot 
confirm the plan.  As with the previous example, a court should 
read the core principles of the absolute priority rule into the 
open-ended fair and equitable standard and reject the plan.   
V. CRITICISMS AND IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDING THE ABSOLUTE 
PRIORITY RULE 
In crafting a theory that holds reorganizing nonprofits to the 
same standards applicable to reorganizing for-profits, this Article 
makes some key assumptions that may raise criticisms of the 
theory.  This Part of the Article identifies and addresses three 
potential criticisms.194  In responding to these criticisms, it begins 
to explore the implications of applying Chapter 11 to nonprofits. 
Most notably, the theory assumes that the reorganizing 
nonprofit remains a nonprofit following reorganization.  The 
theory also assumes that the reorganization plan allocates as 
much going concern value as possible to the nonprofit’s 
creditors—that is, all going concern value not necessary for the 
nonprofit to operate post-reorganization is available first and 
foremost to creditors until they are paid in full.195  As the above 
examples demonstrate, the nonprofit may pay its ordinary course 
of business expenses, but it may not significantly expand its 
operations, such as adding a hospital wing or purchasing cutting 
 
193 See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
194 Special thanks to Professor Lynn M. LoPucki for discussing these criticisms. 
195 See supra notes 131 & 153 and accompanying text. 
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edge medical equipment not available at similar hospitals.  
Unfortunately, in some instances, these two assumptions may 
clash.   
In assuming that all going concern value of a reorganizing 
nonprofit is allocated first to creditors until they are paid in full, 
the theory necessarily affords creditors ownership of the 
reorganized nonprofit.  The going concern value of an ongoing 
entity is the value of the assets of that entity as an operating 
whole;196 thus, the creditors own the nonprofit.  Through this 
ownership, creditors conceivably control the fundamental 
operations and structure of the reorganized nonprofit, which 
includes determining whether the nonprofit remains a nonprofit 
post-reorganization.  Stated succinctly, if all going concern value 
of the reorganized nonprofit is the property of creditors until they 
are paid in full, the creditors should have the ability to 
reorganize the nonprofit into a for-profit.   
This outcome obviously conflicts with the theory’s 
assumption that the reorganizing nonprofit will remain a 
nonprofit post-reorganization.  The question then becomes 
whether it is imperative that a reorganizing nonprofit remain a 
nonprofit.  Part of the reason nonprofits increasingly are seeking 
to reorganize potentially is that their management is under 
pressure to operate nonprofits more like for-profits.197  If so, and 
particularly if a nonprofit is financially unstable, then it might be 
most practical to convert into a for-profit.  Reorganization may be 
the most efficient vehicle to realign a nonprofit’s structure with 
the expectations of its stakeholders, such as donors and creditors.  
Accordingly, the assumption that a nonprofit will remain a 
nonprofit through reorganization may be dispensable. 
Nevertheless, converting from a nonprofit to a for-profit 
represents a fundamental change that seemingly affects the core 
of a nonprofit’s mission.  If a nonprofit cannot survive without 
reorganizing, and if all going concern value must be allocated to 
the nonprofit’s creditors in that reorganization to abide by the 
purposes underlying the Bankruptcy Code, perhaps that 
nonprofit should be ineligible for reorganization unless its 
 
196 See Linda J. Oswald, Goodwill and Going-Concern Value: Emerging Factors 
in the Just Compensation Equation, 32 B.C. L. REV. 283, 289 (1991) (“[G]oing-
concern value reflects the enhanced value of assets arising from their combination 
within an operating business.”).  
197 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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creditors specifically agree that the nonprofit will reorganize as a 
nonprofit.  This outcome resembles the absolute priority rule’s 
application to close corporations.  Unless creditors consent to a 
close corporation’s owners retaining an interest in the 
reorganized business, the close corporation often cannot 
reorganize and the owners lose their business.198  Similarly, 
unless creditors consent to the nonprofit remaining a nonprofit, 
the nonprofit cannot reorganize and most likely will dissolve.  As 
with a close corporation, only if a nonprofit’s creditors approve 
will the nonprofit survive.  Both sets of creditors give up 
something they are entitled to in exchange for the debtor’s 
survival.  Creditors of a close corporation renounce a portion of 
their interest in the reorganized corporation, and creditors of a 
nonprofit forfeit their ability to transform the nonprofit into a 
for-profit.199   
The theory also can be criticized for allocating all going 
concern value of the reorganized nonprofit first and foremost to 
creditors.  Such allocation may not be feasible.  Many nonprofits 
survive based on donations from individuals.200  If a reorganized 
nonprofit’s creditors are entitled to all going concern value until 
they are paid in full, they necessarily are entitled to donations 
 
198 See supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text. 
199 The ability to transform the debtor nonprofit into a for-profit post-
reorganization may be conceptualized as part of the going concern value of the 
debtor to which creditors are entitled. Unless they agree otherwise, the absolute 
priority rule requires that value be allocated to creditors. Because this value allows 
a nonprofit’s creditors to initiate a change that fundamentally alters the nonprofit, 
the Bankruptcy Code would need to be amended to provide a special rule for 
nonprofits that prohibits their reorganization unless their creditors consent to their 
continuation as nonprofits post-reorganization. This rule will provide nonprofits’ 
creditors with the same bargaining power they should be afforded by the absolute 
priority rule: They will be able to threaten to withhold their consent to the 
reorganization if they disapprove of the debtor’s proposed plan. Though this 
bargaining power may seem to give a nonprofit’s creditors too much leverage, the 
creditors of close corporations are provided with similar leverage. 
Alternatively, the rule could provide that a nonprofit’s creditors must consent to the 
reorganization of a nonprofit debtor as a nonprofit if the debtor’s proposed plan 
allocates all going concern value first and foremost to creditors until they are paid in 
full. Logically, under this rule, creditors should realize that they are vulnerable if a 
nonprofit reorganizes, and they may adjust credit terms and other aspects of their 
business relationships with nonprofits accordingly. 
200 See GIVING USA 2011, THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR  
THE YEAR 2010, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (2011) (stating that donations from 
individuals comprised 73% of the revenue from donations received by nonprofits in 
2010), available at http://www.givingusareports.org/products/GivingUSA_2011_ 
ExecSummary_Print.pdf. 
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made to the nonprofit post-reorganization.  But will a nonprofit 
continue to receive donations if individuals know that the 
nonprofit’s creditors can access those donations—that they 
effectively are paying the nonprofit’s creditors?  Similarly, a 
sizable portion of nonprofits’ operating budgets may derive from 
grants, either from private institutions or state and federal 
government agencies.201  Like individual donors, will these 
institutions choose to give to a reorganized nonprofit when those 
grants will go to supporting the nonprofit’s creditors?  Will 
government agencies feel pressured to forego awarding grants to 
reorganized nonprofits because they anticipate that their 
constituents will disapprove of funds effectively going to the 
nonprofits’ creditors?   
Perhaps reorganized nonprofits will continue to receive 
funding because individual donors and grant-giving agencies will 
want to support nonprofits despite the consequences of their 
reorganization.  For example, perhaps these individuals and 
agencies will continue giving because they historically supported 
a certain nonprofit and that nonprofit’s goodwill and record—
notwithstanding its reorganization—still will draw them to it.  
But there is a distinct chance that a reorganized nonprofit will be 
unable to attract funding because donors and grant-giving 
agencies will divert funds that otherwise would have gone to the 
reorganized nonprofit to another nonprofit with a similar 
mission, thereby ensuring that their money will be used to 
further the cause they want to support.  This outcome seems 
especially likely given that if a nonprofit liquidates or dissolves, 
its directors and management are free to start a new nonprofit 
with the same mission.  This new nonprofit effectively will be the 
same as the reorganized nonprofit except it will not be bound to 
its pre-reorganization creditors.  Thus, all funding the new 
nonprofit receives will be available first and foremost for 
fulfilling its mission.  
 
 
201 See id. (stating that donations from foundations and corporations comprised 
19% of the revenue from donations received by nonprofits in 2010). According to the 
National Center for Charitable Statistics, in 2004, government grants made up 
about 9 percent of nonprofits’ revenue. See Frequently Asked Questions, NATIONAL 
CENTER FOR CHARITABLE STATISTICS, http://nccs.urban.org/ 
FAQ/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 11, 2012). 
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Accordingly, it may not be feasible to allocate all of the 
reorganized nonprofits’ going concern first and foremost to 
creditors if a nonprofit is to survive post-reorganization.  Rather, 
the nonprofit’s creditors may need to accept the going concern 
value less donations and similar funding, either by agreement or 
by force.  Though creditors may agree to such an arrangement 
because they understand that the alternative is liquidation, if 
creditors are forced to accept this arrangement, the objectives 
underlying the absolute priority rule will be violated.  In effect, a 
version of the “best efforts” standard commentators recommend 
applying to close corporations and similar entities will be applied 
to nonprofits;202 the reorganized nonprofit will be required to use 
its “best efforts” to allocate all available funds to repaying 
creditors, but if some of these funds, such as donations and 
grants, cannot be made available to creditors without the 
reorganized nonprofit failing, then the funds may be withheld.  
This solution, however, will create the same dichotomy between 
for-profit and nonprofit reorganization that exists now.  Entities 
that otherwise would be unable to reorganize absent their 
nonprofit status will survive simply because they are nonprofits. 
Alternatively, recognizing that certain nonprofits will be 
unable to survive post-reorganization if creditors are allocated all 
going concern value, perhaps these nonprofits simply should not 
be allowed to reorganize.  Courts have rejected nonprofits’ 
proposed reorganization plans upon determining that the plans 
were not feasible because they contemplated unrealistic levels of 
future funding.203  Indeed, the result of applying the principles of 
the absolute priority rule to nonprofit reorganization may be to 
prevent confirmation of more proposed plans on the basis of 
anticipated future funding.  As more nonprofits that rely on 
donations and grants reorganize and either succeed or fail post-
reorganization, it will become clear whether funding ceases if 
nonprofits are required to abide by the absolute priority rule.  If 
so, depending on the portion of nonprofits that rely on donations 
and grants to survive, this may prohibit a large percentage of 
 
202 See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text. 
203 See, e.g., Save Our Springs (S.O.S.) Alliance, Inc. v. WSI (II)-COS, L.L.C. (In 
re Save Our Springs (S.O.S) Alliance, Inc.), 632 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2011) (affirming 
bankruptcy court’s denial of plan confirmation when the proposed plan was not 
feasible because the debtor had not demonstrated sufficient commitments from 
donors). 
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nonprofits from reorganizing.  Those nonprofits that are unable 
to reorganize will liquidate or dissolve; if there is enough 
interest, they can re-emerge as new nonprofits.   
Finally, the theory identifies a nonprofit’s managers as one 
of the groups who are substantively akin to owners for the 
purposes of applying the absolute priority rule to reorganizing 
nonprofits.  Managers, however, inhabit their own position in 
reorganizations.  Debtors may offer managers incentive packages 
designed to entice them to remain with the debtor through its 
reorganization, debtors may eliminate managers it believes are 
ineffective or burdensome, creditors and other parties in interest 
may move to have certain managers removed and a chief 
restructuring officer appointed, and internal battles over post-
reorganization management positions may erupt.  Even so, the 
theory remains workable if managers are not deemed to stand-in 
for equity holders.  The theory ultimately turns on whether a 
nonprofit preserves going concern value for itself—and, thereby, 
its founders, board, members, or, generally, the part of society 
that benefits from the nonprofit’s continued operation—instead of 
allocating that value to creditors until they are paid in full.   
Nonetheless, similar to managers of a close corporation, a 
nonprofit’s managers may be the same individuals as the 
nonprofit’s founders, directors, and members.  In identifying 
managers as beneficiaries of an incongruously applied absolute 
priority rule, the theory recognizes and highlights the dichotomy 
created by courts’ current application of the absolute priority rule 
and fair and equitable standard to for-profit and nonprofit 
entities.  Overall, once courts clearly apply the absolute priority 
rule through the fair and equitable standard to reorganizing 
nonprofits, the viability of reorganization for different types of 
nonprofits may begin to become more apparent.  As more 
information about the bankruptcies of nonprofits is gathered, the 
unique issues that arise when nonprofits seek to reorganize will 
become more perceptible, and the implication of applying 
Chapter 11 to nonprofits that this discussion has begun to 
explore will be better judged.   
CONCLUSION 
The absolute priority rule protects creditors from 
manipulation of their priority to going concern value of a 
reorganizing entity by guaranteeing that a court will not confirm 
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a plan that subordinates their claims to the benefit of the 
debtor’s equity holders without the creditors’ consent.  It thereby 
prevents owners, who may be the same as management, from 
taking advantage of their insider status to the detriment of 
creditors or colluding with senior creditors to freeze out 
intermediate claimants.  The absolute priority rule also affords 
creditors a critical negotiation tool by way of their ability to 
object to a plan that they suspect allocates going concern value 
away from the creditors to which it belongs.  Without the rule, 
unsecured creditors in particular find themselves relatively 
defenseless against attempts by secured creditors and owners to 
use reorganization to discharge debt while retaining a stake in 
the reorganized entity.   
In the context of reorganizations of for-profit entities, the 
absolute priority rule’s application is straight-forward and well-
established.  Only if the reorganizing debtor provides for its 
creditors in full can equity holders receive any of the reorganized 
business’s going concern value.  Conversely, the few courts that 
have encountered absolute priority rule arguments in the context 
of nonprofit bankruptcies have struggled to apply the rule to the 
reorganizing nonprofit.  Though the nonprofit’s proposed plan 
may allow directors, managers, or members to retain control of 
the reorganized nonprofit, and though the plan may appear to 
allow the reorganized nonprofit to retain going concern value 
that most likely belong to creditors, courts have found the 
absolute priority rule categorically satisfied by or inapplicable to 
nonprofits except in limited circumstances.   
Conceivably, courts could hold that such plans violate the 
Bankruptcy Code’s mandate that plans be proposed in good 
faith.204  To determine whether a plan meets the good faith 
requirement, courts examine whether the plan maximizes the 
value of the bankruptcy estate—that is, whether a plan allocates 
going concern value to creditors until they are paid in full.205  
 
204 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(3) (West 2011). 
205 See, e.g., Sec. Farms v. Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, 
Local 890 (In re Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local 890), 265 
F.3d 869, 877 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that courts focus on whether a plan is 
consistent with the primary objectives of the Bankruptcy Code in evaluating good 
faith); Crestar Bank v. Walker (In re Walker), 165 B.R. 994, 1001 (E.D. Va. 1994) 
(noting that “the failure of a debtor to use the full reach of its disposable resources to 
repay creditors is evidence that a plan is not proposed in good faith because such 
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Nevertheless, the existence of the good faith requirement has not 
prompted courts to include detailed inquiries into the allocation 
of going concern value in their opinions addressing nonprofit 
reorganizations.  With nonprofit reorganizations on the rise, 
courts will need to consider the history and principles underlying 
the absolute priority rule in order to hold nonprofits to the same 
standards that Chapter 11 imposes on other reorganizing 
entities. 
Though courts have correctly held that the absolute priority 
rule, as explicitly codified in the Bankruptcy Code, may not apply 
to most nonprofits, the rule represents only one facet of the fair 
and equitable standard.  The theory underlying the absolute 
priority rule remains relevant to nonprofit reorganizations and 
should be considered when deciding whether a nonprofit’s 
reorganization plan is fair and equitable.  The history of the rule 
demonstrates that it is less about equity holders retaining value 
in a reorganized entity, as it is written into the Bankruptcy Code, 
and more about ensuring that a proposed plan provides for 
creditors to the greatest extent possible.  Accordingly, to 
determine whether a nonprofit’s plan is not fair and equitable, a 
court merely needs to investigate whether the plan is too good a 
deal for the nonprofit.  In short, does the plan assign going 
concern value to the nonprofit that should go to creditors?  If so, 
the plan is not fair and equitable for the same reasons that a 
similar plan proposed for a for-profit entity should be found to 
violate the absolute priority rule.  
Courts addressing absolute priority claims in the context of 
nonprofit reorganizations have overlooked or only marginally 
acknowledged the connection between the absolute priority rule 
and the fair and equitable standard.  Recognizing that the core 
tenets of the absolute priority rule may be and should be 
considered when evaluating a nonprofit’s plan will ensure that 
creditors benefit from one of the protections the Bankruptcy Code 
specifically affords them and will bring courts one step closer to 
applying all of Chapter 11’s rigorous approval criteria to 
nonprofits.  It also will elucidate some of the unique issues that 
arise when nonprofits seek to reorganize, laying the foundation 
to better evaluate the viability of nonprofit reorganization.  
 
conduct frustrates” one of the “primary objective[s] of a Chapter 11 reorganization,” 
that is, “prompt payment of creditors”). 
